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QUESTIONS PRESENTED 
1. Did the trial court err in failing to suppress evidence 
illegally obtained by the State through abuse of the Subpoena 
Powers Act? 
2. Did the trial court and the majority in the Court of 
Appeals misperceive the scope and application of the Utah Anti-
trust Act in relation to the facts of the present case? 
3. Was a vertical agreement of exclusive dealing between a 
single buyer and seller of services a criminal group boycott 
under the Utah Antitrust Act? 
4. Did felony RICE convictions based exclusively on 
misdemeanor predicate acts violate the constitutional prohibition 
of cruel and unusual punishment? 
5. Did a juror's knowledge of the earlier conviction of a 
Co-Defendant on the charges against Defendants require a mis-
trial? 
COURT OF APPEALS OPINION 
This Petition for Certiorari seeks review of the opinion of 
the Utah Court of Appeals, Case No. 860357-CA which was filed 
March 9, 1988, and is reported at 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 34. 
RELATED CASES 
A related case decided by this Court is In The Matter of a 
Criminal Investigation, reported at 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, 
March 31, 1988. That case deals with the constitutionality of 
the investigation used to obtain the evidence presented against 
the Defendants in the case at bar. 
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Petitioners seek review of the Utah Court of Appeals deci-
sion entered March 9, 1988. Petition for Rehearing was denied 
April 8, 1988. This Court has jurisdiction to hear this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(5) (1987). 
CONTROLLING CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The following controlling constitutional and statutory 
provisions are reproduced in full in the Appendix to this Peti-
tion. 
U.S. Const. Amendment IV 
U.S. Const. Amendment V 
U.S. Const. Amendment VIII 
Utah Const. Art. I § 7 
Utah Const. Art. I § 9 
Utah Const. Art. I § 12 
Utah Const. Art. I § 14 
Utah Antitrust Act; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-911, et seq. 
Utah Racketeering Influences and Criminal Enterprise Act; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-10-1601, et seq. 
Utah Bribery Statute; 
Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-508 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case 
This is a criminal case. Defendants were charged with 
several counts of commercial bribery, antitrust group boycott, 
and racketeering. 
Course of Proceedings and Disposition in Lower Courts 
Petitioners were tried in 1986 with co-defendant Michael 
Ziemski. Prior to trial the Defendants were granted a severance 
from the trial of co-defendant L. Brent Fletcher. Petitioners 
moved to suppress evidence obtained pursuant to a secret 
investigation in Emery County. The motion was denied. The 
Petitioners were found guilty by a jury on several counts of 
bribery, antitrust and racketeering. Defendant Thompson was 
sentenced to serve not less than one nor more than fifteen years 
in the Utah State Prison. Defendant Conklin was sentenced to 
serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail on work release. 
Each Petitioner was fined $25,000 for the antitrust violations. 
Based on the racketeering convictions the Court also ordered 
forfeiture of all business interest of the Petitioners in the 
security guard companies involved in the case. 
During trial, Petitioners moved for mistrial on the basis 
that the prosecution had improperly elicited from two witnesses 
the fact that the co-defendant Fletcher had previously been tried 
on the same charges and on the further basis that a juror had 
discovered the fact that Fletcher was convicted. These motions 
were also denied. Petitioners filed a Notice of Appeal on 
September 13, 1986. 
Petitioners1 sentences were stayed pending appeal. The 
appeal was originally filed in this Court but was subsequently 
transferred to the Utah Court of Appeals and heard there. Two 
members of the Utah Court of Appeals panel voted to affirm the 
convictions. Judge Gregory K. Orme dissented as to the group 
boycott antitrust convictions. Appellants Thompson and Conklin 
petitioned the Court for a Rehearing. The Petition was denied 
April 8, 1988. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
This case involves the alleged bribery of L. Brent Fletcher, 
an employee of Utah Power & Light Company ("UP&L"), in the spring 
of 1983. Defendants Thompson, Conklin, and Ziemski were the 
payors of the alleged bribes. At various times between 1976 and 
1985, Thompson, Conklin, and Ziemski were either principals in or 
employees of the security guard companies which provided security 
guard services to, among other customers, UP&L. 
Beginning in 1974, and continuing thereafter at: all relevant 
times, Fletcher was the security officer of UP&L. (Tr. 42). The 
position was a staff position, not a management position. (Tr. 
347, 1024, 1103-04). Fletcher's function was to act as a coordi-
nator between management and the guard company. (Tr. 49-50, 
337). He was not, however, authorized to enter or terminate 
guard contracts (Tr. 352, 1024), grant rate increases (Tr. 1024) 
or decide whether a contract should be competitively bid (Tr. 
1025-26, 1105). Fletcher simply made recommendations to a 
committee, and all witnesses agreed that his position was not 
influential. (Tr. 85, 347). 
UP&L first purchased services of outside security guard 
companies in 1976. At that time, miners at UP&L coal mines in 
Carbon and Emery Counties went on strike. UP&L hired the ser-
vices of two independent guard companies, Mike Thompson Associ-
ates and Pinkerton's, Inc., to control the situation. (Tr. 80). 
This arrangement continued until the strike ended. 
In 1978, UP&L decided to hire an outside guard company on a 
permanent basis. Several companies were considered, including 
Pinkerton's and Mike Thompson Associates. (Tr. 80). Upon 
Fletcher's recommendation that Mike Thompson Associates had been 
the most flexible during the strike situation, UP&L entered a 
contract for guard services with Mike Thompson Associates in 
February, 1978. (Tr. 44). Defendant Thompson, the owner of Mike 
Thompson Associates, signed the contract with UP&L. (Ex. 1). 
The contract was renewed in March, 1981. (Ex. 2). 
In 1982, Mike Thompson Associates filed bankruptcy. (Ex. 
74). Performance of the UP&L contract was transferred to 
Vanguard, Inc., a new company formed by Ziemski. (Tr. 171-73, 
732, 734). Neither Thompson nor Conklin were principals in or 
employees of Vanguard. (Tr. 1403-05). After leaving Mike 
Thompson Associates, Thompson joined with Conklin to form Infor-
mation Associates, which provided consulting services in the 
areas of guard training and security services. (Tr. 1389-90, 
1394-96). In August of 1983, Ziemski transferred control of 
Vanguard to Conklin. 
The seven alleged briberies all occurred during the spring 
of 1983. (R. V:47-53, 64-70, 77-83; Ex. 31, 56). Each alleged 
bribe was paid by check from Information Associates to Augie 
Investments, which Fletcher owned. Each check indicated that 
payment was for "consulting services," (Ex. 56), and indeed in 
the spring of 1983 Information Associates was preparing, with 
help from Fletcher, a manual on nuclear power plant security. 
(Tr. 1400-02, 1416), The jury acquitted Defendants on two of the 
bribery counts. 
The State also alleged the payments to be part of a larger 
scheme to eliminate competition for the UP&L contract. (R. 
V:54-57, 71-74, 84-87.) According to that allegation, 
Petitioners Ziemski and Fletcher formed a group boycott, 
beginning in September 1978 and continuing through October 1983, 
pursuant to which the defendants paid Fletcher in order to obtain 
favorable treatment from him in their dealings with UP&L. 
The evidence, however, was that UP&L was satisfied with its 
guard service. (Tr. 90-91, 1188-89, 1223-24, 1236, 1254, 
1294-95, 1311). Indeed, although Fletcher left UP&L in 1983, 
Vanguard continued to provide UP&L security for UP&L until the 
day before trial. (Tr. 97). Further, the evidence established 
that other companies were not precluded from offering services to 
UP&L. (Tr. 98-99, 522-25, 535-38, 582-85). 
Defendants were also charged with racketeering. The State 
alleged that the racketeering violation was established by 
"multiple acts of bribery.1' (R. V:58-64, 75-76, 88-89). With 
respect to Conklin and Ziemski, the briberies alleged to support 
the racketeering counts were the seven bribes allegedly paid in 
1983. With respect to Thompson, the State claimed that eight 
additional bribes were allegedly paid to Fletcher in the spring 
of 1979. 
ARGUMENT 
Certiorari should be granted pursuant to Rule 43(4) of the 
Rules of the Utah Supreme Court since this case presents impor-
tant questions of state law, which should be settled by this 
Court. The issue of the scope and application of the Utah 
Antitrust Act was recognized by the Utah Court of Appeals as one 
of first impression. See State v. Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. 
34, 36 (March 9, 1988). This Court should review the majority 
opinion of the Court of Appeals in light of the strong dissent 
filed by Judge Orme. 
Similarly the Court of Appeals decision expanding the 
application of the good faith exception to the exclusionary rule 
should be reviewed in light of this court's opinion in In the 
Matter of a Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. 3 (March 
31, 1988). The remaining issues presented here are of 
constitutional significance. Accordingly, this Court should 
grant certiorari in order to settle important questions of state 
and constitutional law. 
I. Evidence Obtained Illegally by the State Through Abuse 
of the Subpoena Powers Act Should Have Been Suppressed. On 
March 31, 1988, this Court handed down its opinion in Criminal 
Investigation. In that case, this Court reviewed the consti-
tutionality of the Subpoena Powers Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§ 77-22-12-3 (1982). This Court found the Act to be constitu-
tional on its face so long as certain enumerated guidelines are 
followed. Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 7-16. 
This Court also reviewed the constitutionality of the Act as 
applied in Criminal Investigation and found that it was unconsti-
tutional as applied. Ld. at 3. 
This is extremely important since the evidence used in 
Petitioner's trial in the case at bar was almost wholly obtained 
through the investigation condemned Criminal Investigation. See 
Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 35. 
Although the State's investigation was eventually dismissed 
because of the abuse of the Subpoena Powers Act, the damage to 
the Petitioners had already been done. They were tried with the 
ill-gotten evidence and convicted. A review of this Court's 
analysis of the manner the investigation was conducted reveals 
that the Defendants were denied fundamental state and federal 
constitutional rights. 
Specifically, this Court found that each subpoena issued 
represented that it had been authorized by order of the District 
Court and that disobedience to the subpoena was punishable by 
contempt of court. Since the subpoenas had not been individually 
authorized and because contempt of court is a multi-step process, 
the representations on the supoenas were misstatements which may 
have "improperly discouraged the recipients from challenging the 
supoenas." Criminal Investigation, 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 16. 
This Court further observed that "to the extent that these 
misrepresentations discouraged respondents or other subpoenaed 
parties from exercising their right to challenge the supoenas, 
they denied rights guaranteed by the Act and by the Fourth 
Amendment." I^ i. at 17. 
This Court also noted that the Attorney General failed to 
notify the Defendants (including these Petitioners) prior to 
interrogation "of the general nature and scope of the inves-
tigation and of the right to exercise the privilege against self 
incrimination. These failures violated Respondents state and 
federal constitutional privileges against self incrimination." 
Id. at 17. 
Additionally, this Court held that the secrecy provisions of 
the Subpoena Powers Act were applied too broadly inasmuch as the 
District Court ordered that the good cause affidavit itself was 
a secret document. "[T]o the extent that the concealment of the 
good cause statement impeded the challenge of supoenas or inter-
rogations, it operated to deny rights against unreasonable search 
and seizure." Id. at 17. 
Notwithstanding the serious violation of Defendants1 consti-
tutional rights, the trial court in the case at bar refused to 
suppress the fruits of the illegal investigation. Just days 
before this Court's decision in the Criminal Investigation the 
Court of Appeals held that the evidence was properly admitted at 
trial ff[r]egardless of the decision of the Utah Supreme Court on 
the constitutionality of the Utah [Subpoena Powers Act] . . . ." 
Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 36. 
The Court of Appeals1 rationale was based on the good faith 
exception to the exclusionary rule enunciated by the United 
States Supreme Court in United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 104 
S.Ct. 3405 (1984), and Illinois v. Krull, 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987). 
According to Leon and Krull, a police officer's search in objec-
tively reasonably reliance on an invalid warrant or an unconsti-
tutional statute does not require exclusion of evidence. This 
"good faith11 exception is based on the theory that exclusion of 
evidence produces no deterrent effect on illegal searches when 
the searching officer was acting in reasonable reliance on legal 
authority. 
This rationale is inapplicable in the context of this case. 
The Court here is not dealing with a police officer but rather 
with experienced lawyers employed by the Attorney General's 
Office. While an officer may not be expected to analyze the 
constitutionality of a statute or the propriety of a warrant, a 
prosecutor must be expected to engage in such an analysis. This 
is especially true where, as in the case at bar, the State's 
chief legal office, which is frequently requested to publish 
opinions concerning the propriety of conduct, is in charge of the 
investigation. If the Attorney General's Office can be expected 
to advise the various State agencies as to the proper and legal 
manner to conduct their affairs, then a fortiori that office 
should be expected to conduct its own affairs in conformity with 
legal and constitutional bounds. 
The Court of Appeals ignored the vital distinction between 
police conduct and conduct of the Attorney General's Office. 
Applying the Krull Standard, the Court stated that "the subpoenas 
duces tecum were executed in objectively reasonable reliance on 
prior, external authorization." Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
36. This statement should not stand as good law in Utah for at 
least two reasons. 
First, the Attorney General's Office admitted that the 
Subpoena Powers Act was unconstitutionally applied. Criminal 
Investigation 79 Utah Adv. Rep. at 5. Such an admission is 
inconsistent with the position that the Attorney General's Office 
relied on the Act in good faith. At a minimum, good faith would 
require the Attorney General's Office to engage in a constitu-
tional analysis before applying the Act. 
Secondly, the Court of Appeals' assumption that the Attorney 
General's Office acted in a good faith objective reliance on the 
statute impermissibly shifts the burden of showing lack of good 
faith to the Defendants. Such a shift of burden is unconstitu-
tional. State v. Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181, 186 (Utah 1987). 
This Court should grant a writ of certiorari because Defen-
dants1 fundamental federal constitutional rights were violated by 
the State's abuse of the Subpoena Powers Act. The evidence 
introduced at Defendants' trial should have been suppressed. 
Even assuming arguendo, that the good faith exception 
recognized in Leon and Krull are applicable to the conduct of a 
prosecutor's office, and further assuming that the illegal 
investigation was conducted in good faith, the evidence should 
still have been suppressed. Nothing prohibits this Court from 
imposing more stringent restrictions upon the conduct of law 
enforcement and prosecutors than is imposed under the United 
States Constitution. The rights protected by Sections 7, 12 and 
14 of Article I of the Constitution of the State of Utah need not 
suffer erosion merely because the United States Supreme Court has 
narrowed the scope of the federal constitutional Exclusionary 
Rule. Therefore Petitioners request this Court to consider and 
decide the scope of the protections guaranteed by our State 
Constitution. 
II. Defendants1 Conduct Did Not Constitute a Criminal 
Violation of the Utah Antitrust: Act. This Court should also 
issue a writ of certiorari because the Court of Appeals' decision 
was the first published judicial treatment of Utah's Antitrust 
Act. Furthermore, the Court of Appeals was split in its view of 
the application of that Act with Judge Orme filing a strong, 
thoughtful and persuasive dissent. 
In order to convict on the antitrust group boycott charges, 
three elements were required: 1) That Defendants entered a 
conspiracy or contract in restraint of trade, 2) in the form of a 
group boycott, 3) with specific intent to eliminate competition. 
The legislature has declared its intent that the Utah 
Antitrust Act be interpreted in accordance with federal court 
interpretations of federal antitrust acts. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-10-926 (1979). 
The federal courts have recognized that bribery in and of 
itself does not constitute a violation of the antitrust acts. 
United States v. Boston and Maine Railroad, 380 U.S. 157, 162, 85 
S. Ct. 868 (1965); Calnetics Corp. v. Volkswagon of America, 
Inc. , 532 F.2d 674, 687 (9th Cir. 1976), cert, denied, 429 U.S. 
940 (1976); Municipality of Anchorage v. Hitachi Ltd., 547 F. 
Supp. 633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982). The Court of Appeals majority 
held that a co-defendant's refusal to accept proprosals from 
other security guard companies was sufficient indication that the 
bribes were intended to restrain trade. Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 37. However, in his dissent, Judge Orme pointed out that 
any agreement to deal exclusively with one party necessarily 
contemplates a refusal to deal with other parties. Thompson, 77 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 43 (citing Construction Aggregate Trans, v. 
Florida Road Inc., 710 F.2d 752, 776 (11th Cir. 1983)). Such an 
arrangement does not violate antitrust law. Two Cities Sport 
Service, Inc. v. Charles 0. Finley & Co., 676 F.2d 1291, 1304 n.9 
(9th Cir. 1982). Judge Orme also noted that state law already 
provides for punishment for commercial bribery. Utah Code Ann. 
§ 76-6-508 (1978). 
The majority admitted that the classic definition of "per se 
group boycott" is a situation in which "two or more competitors 
on the same level of the market structure agree to eliminate a 
target horizontal competitor by combining to deny the target of 
elements needed in order to compete." Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. 
Rep. at 38. The Court also recognized that the instant case does 
not present the classic per se group boycott situation. Id. 
However, the Court turned away from the established group boycott 
definition and analysis and replaced it with a much broader 
approach. The Court defined group boycott as "a method of 
pressuring a party with whom one has a dispute by withholding, or 
enlisting others to withhold, patronage or services from the 
target." I_d. at 39. However, as Judge Orme noted, even under 
the majority's definition, no group boycott existed in this case. 
"There was no dispute, no pressure, no enlistment of others to 
withhold services, and no target for elimination." I^d. at 44. 
The majority apparently grouped together all entities offer-
ing the services of security guards as the "target." This 
application is contrary to the accepted definition of the term 
"target," which usually denotes "a person or business against 
which competitive aim is taken . . . ." Reaemco Inc. v. 
Allegheny Airlines, 496 F. Supp. 546, 552 (D.C.N.Y. 1980). Under 
the theory that all security companies were the target of the 
alleged boycott, any such company in existence at the time could 
bring an action against Defendants for treble damages. Utah Code 
Ann. § 76-10-919 (1985). Certainly, the legislature did not 
intend such a result. 
The Court of Appeals observed that several cases recognized 
per se group boycotts between a "single horizontal competitor and 
vertically related company." Thompson, 77 Utah Adv. Rep. at 39. 
Significantly, in each case cited (Cascade Cabinet Co. v. Western 
Cabinet Millwork, 710 F.2d 1366 (9th Cir. 1983); Corn-Tel Inc. v. 
DuKane Corp., 669 F.2d 404 (6th Cir. 1982); Corey v. Look, 641 
F.2d 32 (1st Cir. 1981)) there was a specific identifiable entity 
which had been singled out as the "target11 of the alleged boy-
cotts. The lack of any such target in the present case precludes 
the finding of group boycott under the Court of Appeals majority 
definition, as well as under the traditional definition. 
This Court should review this case in order to resolve the 
questions raised by Judge Orme!s dissent to the Court of Appeals1 
opinion and to clarify the Utah Antitrust Act. 
III. Felony RICE Convictions Based Solely on Misdemeanor 
Charges Violated Defendants1 State and Federal Constitutional 
Protections Against Cruel and Unusual Punishment. The constitu-
tional protection against cruel and unusual punishment "prohibits 
not only barbaric punishments, but also sentences that are 
disproportionate to the crime committed." Solem v. Helm, 463 
U.S. 277, 284, 103 S.Ct. 3001, 3006 (1983). In Solem the United 
States Supreme Court upheld the reversal of a defendant's con-
viction under a state recidivist statute. The defendant in that 
case had several prior felony convictions on his record at the 
time he was convicted of issuing a bad check, a misdemeanor. 
Under the habitual criminal statute, the defendant was sentenced 
to life in prison without parole. The United States Supreme 
Court held that since the sentence was not proportionate to the 
crime it was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment. 
The RICE charges in the present case carry a penalty of one 
to fifteen years in prison in addition to a $10,000 fine and 
significant property forfeitures. However, the predicate acts 
upon which the racketeering charges were based consisted only of 
several alleged briberies which were Class B misdemeanors with a 
maximum jail sentence of six months and which, at the time of 
commission, carried a fine of up to $299.00. 
The fact that a defendant can be subjected to such extreme 
punishment for offenses deemed petty elsewhere in the criminal 
code requires that the RICE Act be limited to predicate acts 
constituting felony offenses. Utah Const. Art. I § 9. 
IV. A Juror's Knowledge That a Co-Defendant Had Been 
Convicted in an Earlier Trial Required the Declaration of a 
Mistrial. When an incident at trial has a reasonable likelihood 
of prejudicing the jury so that it may have affected the result, 
the court should grant a mistrial. State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 
367, 370, 517 P.2d 1322, 1324 (Utah 1974). In the case at bar, 
two of the State's witnesses indicated that co-defendant Fletcher 
had already been tried on the same charges. (Tr. 69-70, 621). 
Later, the court was informed that one of the jurors learned from 
the newspaper that Fletcher had in fact been convicted. (Tr. 
1581-81). This knowledge was very likely to have prejudiced that 
juror. A juror's knowledge or belief that a co-defendant had 
already been found guilty of accepting the very bribes that 
Petitioners are accused of paying could only serve to impermis-
sibly shift the burden of proof to the defendants in the mind of 
that juror. The potential effect of this knowledge or belief on 
the ultimate verdict is too dangerous to ignore. 
The fact that a juror knew of Fletcher's prior conviction 
was even more prejudicial when viewed in "light of the total 
proceeding." Hodges, 517 P.2d at 1324. The inadmissible hearsay 
evidence regarding Fletcher's unusual use of cash, (Ex. 56) 
evidence of UP&L employee misconduct, and the wholesale admission 
of bank records were additional evidentiary errors given short 
shrift by the Court of Appeals. Taken together, these errors 
should have compelled a declaration of mistrial. Thompson, 77 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 42. 
CONCLUSION 
The issues raised in this petition are of substantial import 
to the body of Utah law. Defendants-Petitioners respectfully 
request that this Court issue a Writ of Certiorari to the Utah 
Court of Appeals and provide the review that these issues 
deserve. 
DATED this day of May, 1988. 
SESSIONS & MOORE 
JOHN F. CLARK 
JOHN K. WEST 
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OPINION 
BENCH, Jua^e: 
Derendanrs aopeal their convictions on 
several counts ot bribery, antitrust, and rac-
keteering This aopeal was initially tiled with 
the Utah SuDreme Court and was transierred 
to this Court pursuant to R. Utah S. Ct. 4A. 
We atfirm the convictions. 
Facts 
Between 1976 and early 1984, L. Brent 
Fletcher .vas empioved as security officer tor 
Utah Power and Light ComDanv (UP&L) As 
security officer, Fletcher^ duties were to 
determine the security needs ot the company, 
make recommendations to management, and 
act as coordinator between management and 
the security guard services. In 1978, UP&L 
decided to hire the services ot a security guard 
company on a full-time basis. On Fletcher's 
recommendation, UP&L executed a contract 
.wi th d e f e n d a n t Michael T h o m p s o n ' s 
company, Mike Thompson Associates (MTA), 
in February 1978 This contract was not 
competitivelv bid 
In 1979, Jack Wall, Fletcher's brother-in-
law, was hired by MTA. At Fletcher's 
request, Wall opened a bank account in the 
name of Secuntv Management Consultant 
Services. Between January and June 1979, 
Wall deposited approximately $23,000 in 
checks rrom MTA into this account. In June 
1979, Wall turned over the account and its 
records to Fietcner at his reauest UP&L and 
MTA renewea their contract m March 1981. 
Thompson lett MTA in 1982 and formed 
Information Associates, l security consulting 
firm, with defendant Bruce Conklin, a former 
employee of MTA. Defendant Michaei 
Ziemski, also a former empiovee, tooic control 
ot MTA and signed a new contract with 
UP&L in October 1982. ZiemsKi later cnanged 
the name of MTA to Vanguard International 
Associates, Inc. In 1983, Ziemski transierred 
control of Vanguard to Conkhn. An assign-
ment of the UP&L contract was executed m 
March 1984 
During the soring of 1983, Information 
Associates deposited approximately 525,000, in 
seven separate payments, into the account of 
Augie Investments, also owned by Fletcher. 
Meanwhile, Vanguard deposited about 
$163,000 into the account ot Information 
Associates 
The State of Utah, alleging these multiple 
payments to Fletcher were bribes as pan of a 
scneme to eliminate compention tor the UP&L 
security contract, charged Thompson with 
seven counts ot commercial bnberv, each a 
class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-508<b) (1978), one count 
ot antitrust grouo ooycoti. a second degree 
felonv in violation ot Utah Code Ann. §§76-
10-914 and -920 (1979), and two counts ot 
racketeering, second degree telonies in viola-
tion ot Utah Code Ann. ^76-10-1603 
(1981). Ziemski and Conklin were each 
cnarged with seven counts ot onoerv, one 
count of antitrust group boycott, and one 
count of racketeering. Fietcner, also a defen-
dant, was cnarged with counts similar to 
Thompson Fietcner was tried ^eparateiv and 
convicted prior to defendants' trial. His 
appeal is also decided tms date. 5ee Stats v. 
Fletcher, 11 Utan Adv. Rep. 46 (Utah Ct. 
App. ,March9, 1988). 
Pretrial motions to dismiss ail counts were 
denied. Defendants' motion to suppress evi-
dence obtained pursuant to a secret investig-
ation in Emery Countv was also denied. The 
case was tried to a jurv on July 18 through 
August 1, 1985, the Honoraole Judith M. 
Billings presiding The JUP/ found eacn defe-
ndant guilty ot five counts or bribery and of 
ail racketeering and antitrust counts. Motions 
for mistrial were denied. Thompson was sen-
tenced to serve not less than one nor more 
than fifteen years in the Utan State Pnson. 
Conklin and Ziemski were each sentenced to 
serve one year in the Salt Lake County Jail on 
work release. Eacn defendant was fined 
525,000 tor the antitrust violations. Based on 
the racketeering convictions, the court also 
ordered torreiture of ail business interests of 
defendants in the guard companies involved in 
the case. The sentences were all stayed pending 
appcai 
On appeal, defendants challenge the juris-
diction ot the 'nai court and the court's 
denial of their motion to suppress certain 
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evidence. Defendants also challenge specmc I 
jurv instructions, each or their convictions, 
ana the trial court's denial ot their motion for . 
a mistrial. 
Jurisdiction and Pronaole Cause tor Arrest 
Defendants fin>t argue the affidavit upon I 
wnich their arrest warrants were based railed I 
to estaolisn probaole cause. The arrebt warr-
ants were thererore allegeaiy invalid, and the | 
tnai court was deprived ot junsdiaion over I 
defendants. The Utah Supreme Court has j 
"rejected) the position that the probable cause I 
reauirement tor arrest warrants is jumdicti- I 
onai." State v Scnreuaer, 712 P 2d 264, 272 I 
(Utah 1985) In Schreuder, the defendant I 
challenged her conviction on the ground that | 
the statement presented in support of the I 
arrest warrant failed to estabhsn the reauisite | 
procable cause. The Court, assuming lack of I 
prooaoie cau^e tor the purDOses of discussion, 
aaooted the majority rule that an "illegal 
arrest or detention does not void a subsequent | 
conviction/ Id. at 2-Tl (quoting Centetn v. I 
Pusn, 420 U.S. 103, 119 (1975)). The Court i 
explained: 
[The] prooable cause requirement 
for an arrest warrant oecomes moot 
by the time a defendant has been 
convicted because the much more 
stringent requirements ol proor at 
trial have been employed to protect 
the defendant. 
712 P 2d at 272. In light of Schreuder, we 
hold defendants' challenge to the tnai court's 
jurisdiction u> moot. 
Admissibility of Evidence j 
Defendants next argue the trial court erred 
in denying their motion to suppress certain 
evidence The instant case began with a secret 
investigation conducted in Emery County 
under thz authontv of Judge Boyd Bunnell, I 
Seventh District Court, and pursuant to Utah j 
Code Annotated §§77-22-1 througn -3 
(1982), commonly referred to as the Subpoena | 
Pcv-ers kci or 'he Utau Min.-Grana ^ury \ 
Act. During the investigation, the prosecution | 
used ^uopoenas duces tecum to accumulate I 
most or the evidence used at trial, including | 
tax and bank records from defendants' acco- I 
untants and banKS. Upon a motion by delen- I 
dants challenging the constitutionality ot the | 
Act, Judge Bunnell concluded the Act had 
been aoused and was subject to continual | 
abuse due to its broad terms ana provisions. 
Judge Bunnell declared the Act unconstituti-
onal, dismissed trie investigation, and juasned i 
all outstanding subpoenas. The prosecution's 
appeal of that ruling is now pending betore 
the Urah Supreme Court. In the Matter of a | 
Criminal Investigation, No. 20268 (Utan filed i 
Oct. 25, 1984). 
Based on Judge Bunnell's ruling, defend-
ants filed a motion to suppress ail evidence 
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seized pursuant to the investigation. After a 
hearing on December 27, 1984, Judge Billings 
held Judge Bunnell's ruling to be the law of 
the case. However, in a memorandum decision 
dated January 10, 1985, Judge Billings denied 
defendants' motion to suppress The evidence 
was suoseauentiv admitted to prove the suos-
tance ot the crimes cnarged. 
The basis for the trial court's denial of 
defendants' motion to suppress was as 
follows: 
The appropriate standard for sup-
pression of the evidence acquired 
under the 'Subpoena Powers Act" 
in this case requires that the defe-
ndants show, as the State contends. 
a "suostantial violation' ot defen-
dants' constitutional ngnts and that 
the violation was 'not commuted in 
good faitn," as reauired oy Rule 
12(g), Utah Rules of Criminal 
Procedure (Section 77-35-12(g)). 
Defendants have neither acknowle-
dged this Rule, nor attempted to 
meet the required showing for 
suppression of evidence. 
On appeal, defendants claim the evidence m 
the instant case was obtained without egai 
process and should thererore be suppressed 
Defendants contend the government's actions 
were in violation ot their individual ngnts to 
and expectations of privacy. 
The eniorcement of a subpoena duces tecum 
is subject to fourth amendment restrictions 
against unreasonaole searcnes and seizures, 
aithougn not to the extent or a search warrant. 
Oklahoma Press Pub. Co. v. Walling, 327 
U.S. 186 (1946). Defendants' claims to an 
expectation oi privacy are rights protected 
under the fourth amendment. Rakas v. Illi-
nois. 439 U.S. 128 (1978). Furthermore, 
"[e]vidence is suppressed or excluded only if 
the same was obtained by a violation of the 
Fourth Amendment, designed to protect a 
person's right to privacy ana property." State 
v. Montayne, 18 Utah 2d 38, 41, 414 P 2d 
958,960(1966). 
In United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 
(1934), the United States Supreme Court 
created the good faith exception to the exclu-
sionary rule: where an officer acts in objecti-
vely reasonaole reliance on a subsequentiv 
invalidated warrant, the exclusionary rule does 
not apply. The Utah state legislature codified 
the Leon good faith exception m Utan Code 
Ann. §77-35-12(g) (1982). As prcviousiv 
discussed, the trial court denied defendants' 
motion to suppress for failure to meet the 
requirements ot section 77-35-12(g). 
However, the Utah Supreme Court recently 
invalidated section 77-35-12(g). In State v. 
Mendoza, 748 P.2d 181 (Utah 1987), the 
Court rejected the prosecution's argument 
that the good faith exception snoutd aopiy to 
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an invalid, warrantless stop and search oi a 
vehicle The Court explained that because "no 
outside authority on whicn the officers could 
reasonaoly rely expressly authorized the search 
.., the pohcv toundations ot the Leon exce-
ption do not appear in searcnes of [this 
kind) ' Id. at 185 Furthermore, section 77-
35-12(g) went bevond the scope ot the good 
faith exception in requiring defendants to 
prove a substantial violation oi the'r tourtn 
amendment rignts Since section 77-35-12(g) 
purported to create a good faith exception to 
an investigatory stoo and search and because it 
improperly snifted the burden or proor, the 
Court round the statute violated the fourth 
amendment ot the United States Constitution 
Altnougn section 77-35-12(g) is now 
invalid, the good faun exception to the excl-
usionary rule under Leon is still valid. 
Defendants argue the good faith exception 
appiicaote to search warrants does not appiy 
to the execution of suDpoenas issued pursuant 
to a statute subsequently declared unconstit-
utional. This position is contrary to Illinois v 
Kruil. 107 S.Ct. 1160 (1987) In KrulL the 
Court granted certiorari to determine whether 
the good faith exception to the exclusionary 
rule should oe recosnizea when officers act m 
objectively reasonaoie reliance upon a statute 
authorizing warrantless administrative searcnes 
where the statute is ultimately found io be 
unconstitutional. An Illinois stature permitted 
government officers to conduct warrantless 
searches ot the records ot dealers in automo-
biles ind automobile parts. Such a .searcn 
snowed Kruil to oe in possession ot stolen 
automooiles. Subseauent to 'he search, a 
tederal court in an unrelated matter held tne 
Illinois law to be unconstitutionally oroad. 
Upon motion by defendant, the trial court 
suppressed the evidence based on the tederal 
court ruling The Illinois Supreme Court aff-
irmed, reiecting the state's good taith excep-
tion argument. 
The United States Supreme Court reversed. 
The Court explained the good faith exception 
was estaohshed because the deterrent si feet 
and remedial purpose of the exclusionary rule 
are not served where an officer acts m objec-
tively reasonable reliance on a search warrant 
issued by a neutral magistrate. Likewise, the 
Court held, "if [a) statute is subsequently 
declared unconstitutional, excluding evidence 
obtained pursuant to it prior to such a judicial 
declaration will not deter future Fourth 
Amendment violations bv an officer who has 
sirnpiy fulfilled his responsibility to enrcrce 
the statute as written.' Id. at II67 In Mendoza, 
the Utan Supreme Court noted, "Xrull does not 
a f f e c t o u r c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of 
Leon. In both cases, the officers conducting 
the searches did so in oojectively reasonable 
reliance on prior, external authorization.7 748 
P.2d at 185 n.3. Likewise, in the instant case, 
the subpoenas duces tecum were executed in 
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oojectiveiv reasonable reliance on prior, exte-
I rnal authorization. 
This Court mav affirm a trial court's deci-
sion to admit evidence on any proper ground, 
I even though the trial court assigned another 
j reason for its ruling State v Barber. 747 P 2d 
436 (Utan App 1987) Regardless ot the dec-
ision of the Utah Supreme Court on the con-
I stitutionahtv of the Utah Mini-Grand Jury 
) Act, we hold the evidence obtained pursuant 
j to the subpoenas duces tecum was admissible 
| under the principle set torth in Kruil. The tnai 
| court's denial of defendants1 motion to ^uo-
i press is aifirmed. 
j Antitrust and 'Grouo Boycott" 
Derendants contend the\ were improperly 
I charged with and convicted of conduct in 
| violation of the Utah Antitrust Act, Utah 
* Code Ann. §§76-10-911 througn -926 
(1979). This is the first criminal prosecution 
under the Utah AnLtmst Act and is thus a 
case of first impression. Ihe general provis-
ions of the Utah Antitrust Act are similar in 
I many respects to •'heir tederal coanterparts in 
! the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§1 througn 7 
(1987). Section 76-10-926 provides, "The 
legislature intends that the courts, in constr-
uing this act, will be guided by interpretations 
I given bv the federal courts to comparaoie 
federal antitrust statutes and by other state 
courts to comparable state antitrust statutes ' 
Section 76-10-914(1) of the Utah Antit-
rust Act, like section 1 of rhe Sherman Act, 
states. "Every contract, combination m tne 
form ot trust or otherwise, or conspiracy in 
restraint of trade or commerce is declared to 
be illegal.' Section 76-10-920 furtner pro-
vides: 
Any person who violates section 76-
10-914 by price fixing, oid rigging, 
j agreeing among competitors to 
| divide customers or territories, or 
j by engaging in a group boycott with 
I specific intent ot eliminating com-
petition shall be punisned, if an 
individual, by a fine not to exceed 
$50,000 or by imprisonment for an 
indeterminate time not to exceed 
one year, or botn or, if bv a person 
„other than an individual, a fine not 
to exceed SI00,000. 
Defendants point out there are three elem-
ents to the otfense charged in the instant case: 
(A) a contract, combination, or conspiracy m 
restraint of trade in violation of sect.cn ^6-
I 10-914;
 VB) in the torrn or a group ooycott; 
and (C) with specific intent to eliminate com-
petition. 
(A) 
Defendants argue federal courts uniformly 
have reiused to find commercial bnoery to be 
a contract, combination, oi conspiracy in 
violation of section i ot the Sherman Act. 
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Commercial bribery is defined in Utah Code 
Ann. $76-6-508(b) (1978) as follows: 
A person ... without the consent of 
the employer or principal, contrary 
to the interests of the empiover or 
principal ... confers, offers, or 
agrees to confer upon the employee, 
agent, or fiduciary of an employer 
or principal anv benetit with the 
purpose of influencing the conduct 
of the employee, agent, or fiduciary 
in relating to his employer's or 
principal's affairs[.] 
In United States v. Boston and Maine Rail-
road, 380 U.S. 157, 162 (1965), the United 
States Supreme Court held, "[I]t is doubttul 
that this indictment ... alleges anything more 
in suostance than a bribe. Bribery might well 
be m the family of offenses covered under a 
conflict of interest statute. But it is more 
remote from an antitrust frame of reference." 
In Calneucs Coru. v. Volkswagen of America. 
Inc.. 532 F.Zd 674, 687 f9th Cir. 1976), cert. 
denied. 429 U.S. 940 (1976), the Ninth Circuit 
Court of Appeals held, ' [Commercia l 
bribery, standing aione, does not constitute a 
violation of the Sherman Act." Ana in Mun-
icipality of Ancnorags v Hitachi Cable. Ltd., 
547 F. Suop. 633, 645 (D. Alaska 1982), the 
court held, "Commercial bribery does not in 
itself constitute a violation of the Sherman 
Act." 
While it is true that commercial bribery 
alone is not conduct in violation of federal 
antitrust law, "[wjhen the briber/ is coupled 
with other acts tending to restrain trade, a 
claim under the Sherman Act mav be establi-
shed/' Hitactu, 5&1 F. Supp. at 645; see also 
Associated Radio Serv. Co. v. Page Airways, 
Inc.. 624 F.2d 1342 (5th Cir. 1980). In the 
cases cited by defendants, there was no evid-
ence of any affirmative acts, coupled with the 
bribery, to restrain trade. In the instant case, 
however, the prosecution presented substantial 
evidence of other affirmative acts in restraint 
of trade, e.g., Fletcher's refusal to accept 
proposals from other security guard compa-
nies. 
The dissent suggests that, under the majo-
rity opinion's view, every commercial bribery 
in which the payee performs his end ot the 
bargain would be an antitrust violation. Such 
is not the case. Commercial bribes paid to an 
employee, agent, or fiduciary of UP&L could 
be for other purposes, including rate adjust-
ments, waiver of service fees, and waiver of 
safety requirements. Such purposes are clearly 
not in restraint of trade or anticompetitive. 
Furthermore, had derendants paid Fletcher the 
bnbes in order to influence him to deal excl-
usively with them only alter he had received 
other Kins. their actions arguably would not 
have oeen a conspiracy entered into primarily 
to eliminate competition or restrain trade. 
However, in the instant case, the primary 
purpose of the bribes was to restrain trade bv 
eliminating ail competition for the UP&L 
security contract. The first element of the 
offense was therefore established. 
(B) 
Defendants next argue their alleged agree-
ment with Fletcher did not constitute a group 
boycott, and, therefore, the prosecution failed 
to establish the second element ot the offense. 
Federai courts have long held that wnether a 
particular action or agreement violates the 
Sherman Act depends on wnether it is an 
unreasonable restraint on trade. Board of 
Trade of City of Chicago v. United States. 246 
U.S. 231 (1913). In Chicago Board of Trade. 
the United States Supreme Court established 
the "rule of reason' standard to determine 
whether a restraint was unreasonaoie: 
To determine that question the 
court must, ordinarily consider the 
facts peculiar to the business to 
which the restraint is applied; its 
condition before and aiteF the res-
traint was imposed; the nature of 
the restraint, and its effect, actual 
or prooable. The history of the 
restraint, the evil believed r.o exist, 
the reason for adopting the partic-
ular remedy, the purpose or end 
sought to be attained, are ail rele-
vant facts. This is not because a 
good intention will save an other-
wise objectionable regulation, or the 
reverse; but because knowledge of 
intent may heip the court to inter-
pret facts and to predict conseque-
nces. 
fd. at 238. In other words, "the factfinder 
[must] decide whether under all the circumst-
ances of the case the restrictive practice 
imposes an unreasonable restraint on compe-
tition. ' Arizona v. Mancova County Med. 
Soc, 457 U.S. 332, 343 (1982). 
While federal courts have utilized the ruie of 
reason in determining the legality of most 
restraints alleged to be in violation of the 
Sherman Act, they have also, by experience, 
been able to categorize certain business prac-
tices or relationships as per se unreasonable. 
In Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United 
States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1953), the United States 
Supreme Court held, *[T]here are certain 
agreements or practices wnicn because of their 
pernicious effect on competition and lack of 
any redeeming virtue are conclusively pres-
umed to be unreasonable and thereiore illegal 
without elaborate inquiry as to the precise 
harm they have caused or the business excuse 
for their use." These per se practices include 
price fixing, division of markets, group boy-
cotts, and tying arrangements. Id. Recognition 
of the per se rule obviates the costly and 
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complex litigation a complete rule ot reason i 
inquiry entails. Id.: see also Northwest Who-
lesale Stationers, Inc. v. Pacific Stationery and 
Printing Co.. 472 U.S. 284(1985). 
Although there is a ''marked lack of unifo- I 
rmitv"1 among the federal courts in defining i 
the term group boycott, a classic per se group I 
boycott exists where two or more competitors 
on the same level of the market structure agree 
to eliminate a target horizontal competitor by j 
combining to deny the target of elements 
needed m order to compete. Federal Maritime | 
Comm'n v. Akaebolaget Svenska Amenka j 
Limen, 390 U.S. 238, 250 (1978); United I 
States v. General Motors Corp., 384 U.S. 127, j 
140 (1966); Klor's, Inc. v. Broadway-Hole 
Stores, Inc.. 359 U.S. 207, 212 (1959). See \ 
also L. Sullivan, Handbook of the Law of 
Antitrust 230 (1977). The restraining agree- t 
ment need not "entirely exclude its victims 
from the market / but only "[prevent them] 
from making free choices between market 
alternatives ....* Associated Gen. Contractors 
of California. Inc. v. California State Council 
of Carpenters. 459 U.S. 519, 528 (1983). It is 
the horizontal effect of a group boycott, a 
"naked [restraint) of trade with no purpose 
except stifling ot competition,' which typically 
warrants application of oer se illegality. White 
Motor Co. v. United States, 111 U.S. 253, 263 
(1963). 
Vertical nononce restraints, i.e., comoinat-
ions of persons at different levels of the 
market structure, are generally not treated 
under the per se doctrine but are examined 
under the rule of reason standard. Continental 
T.V., Inc. v. GTE Sylvsuua Inc., -G3 U.S. 36 
(1977). As the United States Supreme Court 
hasexDiained: 
We do not know enough of the 
economic and business stuff out of 
which these arrangements emerge to 
be certain. They may be too dang-
erous to sanction or they may be 
allowable protections against aggr-
essive competitors or the only pra-
cticable means a small company has 
for breaKing mto or staying in 
business and within the "rule of 
reason." We need to know more 
than we do about the actual impact 
of these arrangements on competi-
tion to decide whether they have 
such a "pernicious effect on comp-
etition and lack ... any redeeming 
virtue." 
White Motor Co., 372 U.S. at 263 (quoting Nor-
thern Pacific, 356 U.S. at 5) (citations 
omitted), in Continental T.V., the Court 
further explains that while "[vjerticai restrict-
ions reduce intrabrand competition by limiting 
the number of sellers of a particular product 
comoeung tor the business ot a given group of 
buyers ..., [they also! promote inter brand 
competition bv allowing the manufacturer to 
acnieve certain eificiencies in the distribution 
of his products.' 433 U.S. at 54. 
Under the Sherman Act, both classic grouD 
boycotts and vertical restraints determined 
unreasonable are subject to criminal penalties. 
Section 1 of the Sherman Act provides: 
Every person who shall make any 
contract or engage in any combin-
ation or conspiracy hereov declared 
to be illegal shall be deemed guilty 
of a felony, and, on conviction 
thereof, shall be punished by fine 
not exceeding one million dollars if 
a corooration, or, if any other 
person, one hundred thousand 
dollars, or by imprisonment not 
exceeding three years, or by both 
said ounishments, in the discretion 
of the court. 
Section 76-10-920 of the Utah Antitrust 
Act, however, criminalizes only the four types 
of conduct that have been cieariv labeled as 
per se violations of the Sherman Act.2 The 
rule of reason analysis has no pan in the cri-
minal provisions of the Utah Antitrust Act. 
Therefore, unless defendants' conduct was in 
the form of a grouo boycott, it was not cri-
minal under Utah law. 
The instant case is not a classic group 
boycott. The prosecution claims this is an 
arrangement between a group oi horizontal 
competitors, i.e., the three defendants. At no 
time, however, did anv two of defendants co-
exist as comoeutors. Rather, they were succ-
essive owners of the same security guard 
comoany, albeit the company had different 
names under different owners. Therefore, :he 
alleged agreement between defendants and 
Fletcher did not constitute a classic group 
bovcott under the federal definition. 
However, the group boycott specified in 
section 76-10-920 is not the classic group 
boycott recognized by federal courts. Under 
the classic (per se) grouo boycott definition, 
proof of intent and/or effect is not required, 
but it is conclusively presumed the boycott is 
anticompetitive and in violation of antitrust 
laws. Northern Pacific. 356 U.S. at 5. Under 
section 76-10-920, the prosecution is requ-
ired to prove a defendant engaged m a grouo 
boycott "witii (the} specific intent of e/fmina-
ting competition." When interpreting a statute, 
we assume the legislature used each term 
advisedly and in its proper sense. Home v. 
Home, 737 P.2d 244, 247 (Utan App. 1937); 
Stare v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 37 (Utah 
1987). We construe the statute 'on the assu-
mption ... that the intent of the Legislature is 
revealed in the use of the term in the context 
and structure in which it is placed." Ward v. 
Richfield Citv, 716 P.2d 265, 266 (Utan 1984), 
By requiring a separate element of * specific 
intent of eliminating competition," the legisi-
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ature cieariv did not aaopt the classic group 
bovcott definition formulated by the federal 
courts 
The term group ooycott as used b> the Utah 
state legislature more closely resembles the 
general definition of boycott, "a metnod of 
pressuring a party with wnom one has a 
dispute by withholding, or enlisting others to 
withhold, patronage or services from the 
target." St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. 
Born, 438 U S. 531, 541 (197*) In the instant 
ca^e. defendants, through bribes, enlisted 
Fletcner to retuse any bids trom their comp-
etitors, the targets of the boycott. A group 
boycott under the Utah Antitrust Act requires 
at least two conspirators, but neither the 
numoer of bo>cotters nor their market re'ati-
onshiD with the target is determinative of cri-
minal Lability. Rather, the intent of the con-
tract, combination, or conspiracy is the deci-
ding element. 
The dissent proposes an alternative interp-
retation of section 76-10-920, suggesting the 
specific anticompetitive intent element is int-
ended to narrow tne scope of the teaerai def-
inition ot a classic group bovcott. The dissent 
also suggests the majority opinion fails to 
consider the anticompetitive effect of defend-
ants' actions in the relevant marketplace. In 
essence, the dissent suggests we adopt the 
classic per se definition ot group ooycott but 
that we use the rule ot reason in evaluating the 
elements ot proof. Federal courts have consi-
stently held that classic group boycotts 
include, by detimtion, the elements of antic-
ompetitive intent and eifect in the relevant 
marketplace. See National Collegiate Athletic 
Ass'n v. Board ot Resents ot Univ. of Okla-
homa. 463 V.S 35, 103 (1984) ("Per se riles 
are invoked wnen surrounding circumstances 
make the likelihood of anticompetitive 
conduct so great as to render unjustified 
further examination of the challenged 
conduct."). It makes no sense to adopt the 
classic per se definition of group boycott and 
then to require proot of anticompetitive intent 
and market effect. We therefore cannot accept 
the dissent's interpretation ot section 76-10-
920. 
Our interpretation of the Utah Antitrust Act 
is in une with a current trend in federal case 
law to focus not on the form of the conspi-
racy, but on the intent of the conspirators. In 
Continental T.V., the United States Supreme 
Court, after establishing the rule of reason 
analysis as the general standard for vertical 
restraints, stated "we do not foreclose the 
possibility that particular applications of ver-
tical restrictions might justify per se pronioi-
tion." 433 U.S. at 58. increasingly, federal 
court* are recognizing per se group ooycotts 
between a single horizontal competitor and a 
vertically related company. See Cascade 
Cabinet Co. v. Western Cabinet and Mill-
work. 710 F.2d 1366 (9th Or . 1983); Com-
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Teh Inc. v. DuKane Corp , 669 F 2d 404 (6th 
Cir. 1982); Corev v. Look, 641 F 2d 32 (1st 
C r . 1981) See also Sullivan, Antitrust, at 231 
n 1, Decker, The Numerosity Requirement For 
Croup Boycotts: Toward a Horizontal Benefit 
Analysis, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev. 577 (1984), Bauer, 
Per Se Illegality of Concerted Refusals to 
Deal: A Rule Ripe for Reexamination, 79 
Colum. L. Rev. 689 (1979). These cases and 
commentators urge tnat when applying the per 
se rule to a group ooycott, tne xey mauines 
snould not be the numoer or nature of the 
conspirators, but their intent and/or the 
effect ot the restraint on competition. No logic 
supports ignoring defendants' anticompetitive 
conduct in the instant case soiely because they 
failed to recruit a second horizontal compet-
itor into their conspiracy. See Decxer, The 
Numerosnv Reauirement, 18 U.S.F.L. Rev at 
587 ("[I]f a single firm nas the necessary infl-
uence to effectuate an exclusionary boycott 
with a supplier or customer, sucn conduct 
should not escape the per se ruie simply 
because that firm did not comnine with others 
at its own market Jevei to exert its influ-
ence."). Althougn the coercive pressure was 
applied vertically, the stifling of competition 
was horizontal. Com-TeL Inc.. 669 F 2d at 
409. A conspiracy in the iorm of a group 
boycott was therefore establisned. 
(C) 
Under our interpretation of sections 76-10-
914 and -920, therefore, the group boycott 
involving defendants and Fletcher would be 
criminal upon a proper showing of a specific 
intent to eliminate competition. When the 
specific intent or a defendant is an element of 
the criminal offense charged, the intent mav 
be inferred from the defendant's conduct and 
surrounding circumstances. State v. Fowter, 
745 P.2d 472, 475 (Utan Aop. 1987); State v. 
Kennedy, 616 P 2d 594, 598 (Utah 1980). In 
the instant case, not one of the contracts 
between UP&L and defendants was competi-
tively bid. Representatives of other large 
companies testified the usual course of action 
wnen selecting a security guard company is 
open bidding. Several representatives of other 
security guard companies testified their atte-
mpts to submit bid proposals to Fletcner were 
either refused or ignored. Sufficient evidence 
was presented to the jury ro infer a specific 
intent ot eliminating competition on the part 
of defendants. The third element of the 
offense was clearly established. 
We hold defendants were properiy charged 
with engaging m a cnminai group boycott 
under sections 76-10-914 and -920 Under 
our interpretation of the Utan Antitrust Act, 
an individual is clearly on notice that if he (or 
she) engages in a contract, comomanon, or 
conspiracy in restraint of trade, with tne spe-
cific intent of ehminatmg comvetition, regar-
dless of who his co-consoirators are, he will 
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be criminally liable. 
Because there is some evidence, mc'uding 
reasonable inferences, to support every 
element of the jury's verdict, we will not 
disturb it on aDpeal Srafe v Garcia, 744 P 2d 
1029 (Utah App. 1987). Defendants' convict-
ions on the antitrust counts are affirmed. 
Racketeering and 'Pattern'1 of Activity 
Detenaants argue they were improperly 
charged with and convicted of conduct in 
violation ot the Utah Racketeering Infljences 
and Criminal Enterprise Act, Utah Code Ann. 
§§76-10-1601 through -1608 (1981) (the 
RICE Act). When this case was tried, section 
76-10-1603(1) provided: 
It shall be unlawful for any person 
who has received any proceeds 
derived, ^nether directly or indire-
ctly, from a pattern ot racketeering 
activity m which such person has 
participated, as a principal, to use 
or invest, directly or indirectiv, any 
part oi sucn proceeds, or the pioc-
eeds derived from the investment or 
use thereof, in the acquisition or 
any interest in, or the establishment 
or operation ot, any enterprise. 
A "pattern of racketeering activity' was 
defined in section 76-10-1602(4) as. 
engaging in at least two episodes of 
racketeering conduct which have 'he 
same or similar objectives, results, 
participants, victims, or methods ot 
commission, or are otnerwise inte-
rrelated ov distinguishing characte-
ristics and are not isolated events, 
provided at least one of such epis-
odes occurred atter the effective 
date of this part and the last of 
which occurred within rive years 
after the commission of a prior 
episode or racketeering conduct.3 
Violation of the RICE Act is a second degree 
felonv punishable by uo to 15 years impriso-
nment, a fine of 510,000, and forieiture of all 
property associated with the racketeering ent-
erprise. 
Defendants first contend the RiCL Act, 
patterned atter the federal Racketeer Influe-
nced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 
U.S C. §§1961 through 1968 (1984) (the 
RICO Act), was enacted to prevent the infilt-
ration of organized crime into Utah. There-
fore, defendants argue, the RICE Act should 
extend onlv to cases involving oifenses com-
mitted by organized crime. 
Although the legislative histories of both the 
RICE and RICO Acts suggest they were inte-
nded to apply to persons engaged in acs tra-
ditionally associated with organized crime, a 
nexus to organized crime was not included as 
an element of the oifense. The United States 
Supreme Court concluded that the RICO Act 
applies to "any person" who engages in 
conduct the Act forbid > Sedima. S P R.L v 
Imiex Co , / l ie . 473 U S 479, 105 S Ct 3275, 
3285 (1985) Similarly, we hold Utah's RICE 
Act is not limited in aophcation to persons 
arfiliated with organized crime 
Detendants contend that not limiting appl-
ication ot the RICE Act to serious and aggr-
avated offenses by organized crime renders the 
Act unconstitutionally vague. Vagueness is a 
question of procedural due process, namely 
"whether the statute adequately notices the 
proscribed conduct. ' State v Frarnpton, "31 
P 2 d 183. 192 (Utah 1987). Defendants claim 
without requiring that the conduct proscribed 
demonstrate characteristics traditionaiiv asso-
ciated with orgamzed crime, the RICE Act 
does not specincailv define tor persons of 
ordinarv intelligence the outer perimeter ot 
acceptable conduct. Stats v Owens, 638 P.2d 
1182, 1183 (Utah 1981). The RICE Act pros-
cribes the use of proceeds derived from a 
pattern ot racketeering activity in an enterp-
rise. Under the s ta tu te , "^enterprise,' 
"racketeering activity," and "pattern of rack-
eteering activity" are all clearly defined 
"Episode" is defined in Utah Code Ann }76-
1-101 (1978). We hold that the RICE Act is 
"sufficiently explicit to inform the ordinary 
reader what conduct is prohibited," and is 
theretore not unconstitutionally vague. Stare 
v. Theobald. 645 P 2d 50, 51 (Utah 1982). 
Under section "6-10-1602(l)(h), bnber> 
was included as an act of racketeering, some-
times referred to as a predicate act.4 Defend-
ants argue chat using commercial bnoery, a 
class 8 misdemeanor punishable by up to six 
months in tail and a fine ot up to $299, to 
satisfy the RICE Act requirement or predicate 
offenses violates 'he constitutional restraint 
against disproportionate pumsnment. In revi-
ewing a claim ot disproportionate punishment, 
the question is "whether the sentence imposed 
in proportion to the offense committed is such 
as to shock the moral sense ot ail reasonable 
men as to wnat is right and proper under the 
circumstances ' State v. Hanson. 627 P 2d 53 
56 (Utah 1981) (quoting State v Nance. 20 
Utah 2d 372, 438 P 2d 542, 544 (1963)) 
Defendants' argument ignores the additi-
onal elements required under the RICE Act, 
i.e., a pattern of racketeering activity, exist-
ence of an enterprise, and use of proceeds 
derived from the racketeering activity to est-
ablish, acquire, or operate the enterprise 
Detendants claim these elements are lllusorv 
We disagree It is not the commercial briberies 
that are being punisned in the present case, 
but the broader conduct which is forbidden bv 
the RICE Act. Cf. United States v Field, 432 
F. Supp. 55 (S D N.Y. 1977), j / f J 578 F 2d 
1371 (2nd Cir. 1978), cert, dismissed, 439 U S. 
801 (1978) (Congress entitled to make pattern 
of racketeering an independent criminal 
offense ounisnaole Tiore severely than simoiv 
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twice the penaity for each constituent offense). 
We do not find defendants3 sentences for the 
R I C E v i o l a t i o n s u n c o n s t i t u t i o n a l l y 
"shocking." 
Defendants also argue the use of misdeme-
anors as predicate acts under the RICE Act is 
inconsistent with Utah's habitual criminal 
s t a t u t e , Utah Code Ann . §76-8-1001 
(1978), and the enhancement provision of the 
Utah Controlled Substances Act, Utan Code 
Ann. §58-37-S(l)(b)(iii) (1987). Under 
section 76-8-1001, upon proof that a person 
has Deen twice convicted, sentenced, and 
committed for a felony, one of which is at 
least of the second degree, the person may be 
sentenced as a habitual criminal for a period 
of five years to life. Under section 5S-37-
8(l)(b)(iii), upon a second conviction for 
production or distribution of a controlled 
suostance, a class A misdemeanor, a person is 
guilty of a third degree felony. 
The RICE Act is not inconsistent with these 
criminal provisions. The RICE Act does not 
simpiy punish multiple violations of statutes 
prohibiting the acts enumerated in section 76-
10-1602(1). Instead, the RICE Act punishes 
participation in a pattern of racketeering act-
ivity bearing the required relationship to an 
enterprise. See subsections 76-10-1603(1) 
through (4). 
Finally, defendants argue the evidence at 
trial failed to establish a pattern of racketee-
ring activity. "Pattern of racxeteering activity" 
was defined in section 76-10-1602(4) as "at 
least two episodes of racketeering conduct 
which have the same or similar objectives, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of 
commission, or are otherwise interrelated by 
distinguishing characteristics and are not iso-
lated events ...." Defendants claim the several 
counts of bribery of which they were convicted 
were, as a matter of law, part of only a single 
episode oi racketeering conduct and thus 
cannot establish a pattern. In support of their 
argument, defendants cite several federal cases 
involving civil claims under the RICO Act. 
The federal definition of a pattern of racket-
eering activity differs significantly from the 
definition of the same term in section 76-10-
1602(4).5 Federal cases which elaborate on the 
federal definition of "pattern of racketeering 
activity'' are, however, helpful in our analysis. 
Federal case law after Sedima has attempted 
judicially to refine the definition of "pattern 
of racketeering activity" of the RICO Act. 
Those cases have emphasized the concepts of 
"continuity pius reiatedness" discussed in 
Sedima. Against this backdrop, some federal 
courts have fashioned requirements that there 
be "multiple schemes* or "multiple criminal 
episodes" rather than several acts to accomp-
lish a single criminal objective in order to 
establish a pattern of racketeering activity. 
- The case of Torwest DBC. Inc. v. Dick, 628 
F.Sunp. 163 (D. Colo. 1986), cited by defen-
sor comoutc Ulan COQC Annotations, 
28 
dants, alleged multiple acts of mail/wire 
fraud in connection with a single scheme to 
defraud. The district court held that no 
pattern existed where the defendants' conduct 
had a singie purpose, a single result, one set of 
participants, a singie victim, and one method 
of commission. The district court thus concl-
uded there was "no continuity and, therefore, 
no pattern of racketeering activity/ Id. at 
166. The Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals 
affirmed, but differentiated the case from one 
where "the RICO claim is based on one 
scheme involving one victim, but the plan 
contemplates open-ended fraudulent activity 
and does not have a single goal that, when 
achieved, will bring the activity to an end." 
Torwest DEC, Inc.\. Dick, 810 F.2d 925, 929 
(10th Cir. 1987). Other federal courts have 
noted that an ongoing scheme involving the 
same perpetrators, victims, and method of 
commission may in itself demonstrate a suff-
icient pattern of racketeering activity. See 
Thomnson v. Wyoming Alaska, Inc., 652 
F.Supp. 1222, 1227-23 (D. Utah 1987); Tem-
poraries, Inc. v. Maryland National Bank, 
638 F.Supp. 118, 123 (D. Md. 1986) ("A more 
flexible and accurate approach to identifying 
patterns may be to require either 1) more than 
one scheme or 2) an open-ended continuous 
scheme which contains a multiplicity of pred-
icate acts."). 
We conclude the RICE Act's definition of 
pattern requires separate but related criminal 
episodes as the basis for a pattern. We aiso 
conclude that the facts of the case before us 
satisfy the requirement of separate but related 
criminal episodes suggested by the federal 
cases and implicit in the definition of pattern 
of racketeering activity contained in section 76-
10-1602(4). Defendants were each charged 
with seven different bribes paid in approxim-
ately two week intervals between February and 
May 1983. Ajn episode is defined in section 76-
1-401 as "all conduct which is closely related 
in time and is incident to an attempt or an 
accomplishment of a singie criminal objec-
tive." The trial court instructed the jury as 
follows: 
If you should find one or more of 
the defendants guilty of bribery, 
you must then determine whether 
the seven identified payments con-
stitute seven separate bribes, or a 
series of payments on a single bribe. 
If you find beyond a reasonable 
doubt that each of the payments 
was made with a distinct and sepa-
rate purpose, then there are sepa-
rate bribes. On the other hand, if 
the evidence does not convince you 
beyond a reasonable doubt that the 
payments were made with different 
purposes, then such payments con-
stitute one bribe. 
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Defendants argue the seven payments were 
in furtherance of a single criminal objective 
and therefore constituted a single episode. 
Determining the existence of a single offense 
or multiDle offenses is a Question ot intent to 
be determined by the particular tacts ana cir-
cumstances of each case. State v. KlmbeU 620 
P.2d 515, 513 (Utah 1980). Althougn the 
overail scheme was to maintain defendants* 
exclusive contract with UP&L, there was evi-
dence to support the jury's finding a separate 
purpose for eacn bribe, i.e., Fietcner's hiring 
of defendants' company before execution of a 
contract, his recommendations to UP&L 
management, and his refusal to consider other 
bids. The fact the jury convicted defendants 
on only five of the seven bribery counts indi-
cates they considered the facts and circumst-
ances of each payment individually and made 
a determination as to each. As there is evid-
ence to support the jury's findings, we will 
not disturb them on aopeal. Garcia, 744 P.2d 
at 1030. 
Defendants' convictions of violations of the 
RICE Act are affirmed. 
Miscellaneous Issues 
Defendants ah>o argue their bribery convic-
tions should be reversed because the trial court 
erred in not instructing the jury that an illegal 
bribe must be paid with criminal intent. The 
trial court instructed the jury as follows: 
Before you can convict any defen-
dant for bribery you must find 
beyond a reasonable doubt each 
and every one of the following ele-
ments: 
(1) That the defendant or defend-
ants in Salt Lake County, State of 
Utah: 
(2) On or about the date or dates 
alleged in the Iniormanon; 
(3) That the defendant or defend-
ants conferred, offered or agreed to 
confer upon L. Brent Fletcher a 
benefit: 
(4) That this benefit was conferred 
or offered with the purpose of inf-
luencing the conduct of Mr. Flet-
cher in relating to the affairs of 
Utah Power and Light contrary to 
the interests of Utah Power and 
Light and without its consent; 
(5) That the defendant or defend-
ants offered or conferred or agreed 
to confer the benefits, if any, kno-
wingly, intentionally or willfully as 
those terms are defined in these 
instructions. 
We believe the instruction sufficiently 
advised the jury on the law. Both the statute 
and the instruction unpucitly require a crim-
inal intent by requiring a showing of conduct 
contrary to the interests of and without tne 
consent of the emDJoyer or principal. See Stale 
v. O'Netil, 103 Wash.2d 353, TOO ?.2d 711 
(1985). Defendants' convictions of bribery are 
affirmed. 
Defendants next argue the tnai court made 
prejudicial errors in the admission of certain 
evidence. Even assuming the trial court did 
err, defendants have failed to show the chall-
enged evidence had a substantial influence in 
bringing about the verdict. Therefore, the 
errors, if any, were not prejudicial. Utah R. 
Evid. 103; State v. Velarde, 734 P.2d 440, 448 
(Utah 1986). 
Finally, defendants argue the trial court 
erred in not granting a mistrial after two wit-
nesses mentioned the Fletcner trial ana one 
juror told the court she had read of Fletcher's 
conviction in the newsoaper during the trial. 
With regard to motions for mistnai, the Utah 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The critical inquiry should be 
whether there is a reasonable likel-
ihood that the incident so prejud-
iced the jury that in its absence 
there might have been a different 
result. Due to his advantaged posi-
tion and consistent with his respo-
nsibilities as the authority m charge 
of the trial, the inquiry is necessa-
rily addressed to the sound discre-
tion of the trial court. He should 
view such an episoae in the light of 
the total proceeding, and if he 
thinks that there has been such 
prejudice that there is a reasonaole 
probabi l i ty that the defendant 
cannot have a fair and impartial 
determination of his guilt or inno-
cence, he should of course grant a 
mistrial. But inasmuch as this is his 
primary responsibility, when he has 
given due consideration and ruled 
upon the matter, this court on 
review should not upset his ruling 
unless it clearly appears that he has 
abused his discretion. 
State v. Hodges, 30 Utah 2d 367, 517 P.2d 
1322, 1324 (Utah 1974} (footnote omitted). 
Defendants have failed to show any clear 
abuse of the trial court's discretion. The trial 
court and counsel both questioned the juror. 
The juror indicated the fact of Fletcher's 
conviction had no impact on her deliberations 
and was not discussed with the other jury 
members. Furthermore, the trial court adeq-
uately instructed the jury to only consider the 
evidence introduced at trial. The denial of 
defendants' motion for a mistnai is affirmed. 
The jury verdict on ail counts is affirmed. 
Russell W. Bench, Judge 
I CONCUR: 
Richard C. Davidson, Judge 
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1 St Paul fire Jc Manns Ins. Co v Barry, 438 
US ^31.543(1978) 
2 In contrast to the Sherman Act, the Utah Antu-
rust -\u 'attempts to oroviae ooth the prosecutor 
ana the community at large with a clear definition 
ot vvnat ^onduct i^  criminally proscnred.' J Dibble 
& J Jaraine, The Utah Antitrust Act ot 1979 
Getting Inro The State Antitrust Business, 1980 
UtanL Rev 73, S3 
3 In i°S7, the state legislature substantial!/ revised 
the RICE Act and renamed it the 'Pattern oi Unl-
awrul Acti*uv Act ' After the 1987 revision, 'at 
least three episoaes ot unlawtul activity" are now 
requred 
4 ratter the 1987 revision, section 76-10-1602 
now lists the several statutory types or bnoery ina-
wiauailv, including commercial bribery under 
section "6 t>-5QS 
5. 18 U S C §1961(5) defines 'pattern ot rackete-
ering activity is "at least two acts or racketeering 
activit\ * This definition has been tne subject or 
consiucraoie judicial attention following the land-
mark United States Supreme Court decision in 
Sedima. S P R.L v. Imrex Co , Inc., 473 U S 479, 
'05 ^ Cc :2~5 (1985) n its now ramous iootnote 
14, ihe Court noted the lack ot specificity in the 
federal detinition ot pattern ot racketeering activity. 
After a Driet discussion ot suggestions in the legisl-
ative historv that "pattern' connotes 'continuity 
plus retationsnip' rather than merely an enumera-
tion or acts, the Court observed* 
Significantly, in detimng "pattern' in a 
later provision of the same bill, Cong-
ress was more enlightening* "criminal 
conauct forms a pattern if it emoraces 
criminal acts that have tne same or 
similar purposes, results, paniciDants, 
victims, or methods ot commission, or 
otherwise are interrelated by distinguis-
hing cnaractensucs and are not isolated 
events * 18 U S.C. }3575(e) This lan-
guage may be usetul m interpreting 
other sections ot the Act. 
105 S.Ct at 32S5 The pattern definition noted by 
the Supreme Court is suostantiailv identical to the 
detinition contained in the RICL Act. Thus, the 
pattern analvsis under the RICE Act does not 
operate trom the j>ame sparse language of the RICO 
Act 
I ^nows derenuants' intent was stnctlv to line 
their own pockets and not, in any sense, ro 
i eliminate competition. 
| COMMERCIAL BRIBERY 
I I do not view Utah's antitrust statute as the 
appropriate vehicle for bringing commercial 
bribery charges. In addressing this issue, the 
trial court properly recognized the Roomson-
. Patman Act as tne veniue unuer wmen tederai 
commercial bribery charges are typically 
brougnt.1 The court interpreted the Legisia-
| ture's failure to incorporate a Rooinson-
i Patman Act as evidencing an intent to make 
] Utah's antitrust statute the appropriate vehicle 
for charging commercial bnberv. I believe the 
fairer interpretation is that the Legislature 
deliberately tailed to incorporate the Robinson-
Paiman-tvpe act into our antitrust statute 
| because it recognized tnat Utah already has a 
| specific vehicle for prosecuting commercial 
J bribery, nameiv the commercial bnberv 
j statute. Utah Coae Ann. }76-6-5CS U978). 
J Even assuming that commercial bribery is 
j properly charged under rhe Utah antitrust 
statute, the majority concedes tne onpery must 
be coupled wuh other acts intended to restrain 
trade in order to estaoush a violation While 
the majority recognizes the principle that 
f commercial bnoery, without more, does not 
violate the antitrust laws, it onlv otfers Flet-
cher's unilateral reiusal to accept proposals 
from other security companies as the 'more' 
which is necessary to turn an otherwise garoen-
vanety bnpe into an antitrust violation, 
f However, any agreement to deal exclusive!> 
1 wuh one party necessarily involves a retusal to 
[ deal with other parties. See. e.g., Construction 
Aggregate Trans, v. Florida ROCK Ina. Inc., 
710 ?.2d 752, 776 (1933) (every exclusive 
dealing arrangement necessarily involves the 
exclusion of an entity whicn operates on tho. 
j same market level). At least absent evidence of 
other illegal conduct, the defendants' payment 
of bribes did not consume a contract, comb-
ination, or conspiracy in violation ot the ant-
itrust statute. Fletcher's refusal to engage tne 
I services of defendants' competitors was 
I merely tne bargained lor object of *ne snoes 
j in question. Under tne majority's view -
I notwithstanding the claim that more than a 
I typical commercial bribe is required - ess-
! entially every commercial bribe would be an 
antitrust violation if onlv the payee perlormed 
his or her end of the bargain. 
GROUP BOYCOTT 
As the majority ooser\es, under §76-10-
920 of the Utah Antitrust Act, onlv four spe 
cific antitrust violations, "clearly labeled as 
per se violations of the Sherman Act," are 
criminal offenses in Utah. Defendants in tnis 
case were charged with having committed only 
one such violation, namely a group boycott. 
As the majority states, the Legislature inte-
ORME, Judge: (Dissenting in part) 
While i otherwise tully concur in the maj-
ority opinion, I disagree with the result 
reached and portions of the analvsis in the 
section entitled "Antitrust and 'Group 
Bovcott'." 
As the majority states, there are three eie- i 
ments of the antitrust oifense as charged m 
this cise* (I) a contract, comomation or con-
spiracy in restraint ot trade: (2) m the torm of j 
a group boycott; ana (3) with specific intent to 
eliminate competition. I simply do not believe 
that the^e elements have been met. My disag- j 
reement >vith my colleagues is quite complete. I 
I believe defendants' conduct constituted I 
simcie commercial bnoerv. I believe their ' 
conduct can in no way be property character-
ized as a group boycott, f believe the evidence , 
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nded that teaeral interpretations be considered 
in construing the Utan statute where approp-
riate however, unlike .vith the Snerman Act, 
the Utah statute was aesigred to unambiguo-
usly define antitrust violations whicn will give 
rise iO cr mmal sanctions in th s ^cate bee 
Dibbie <&. Jardine, The Utah Antitrust Act of 
1979 Getting Into the State Antitrust Busi-
ness, 1980 Utah L. Rev 7 3 , 83 The majontv 
concedes tnat fre agreement between defend-
ants and Fletcher did not constitute a classic 
group oovcott under 'he tederal detmition ana 
that "uniess defendants' conduct was n the 
form or a grouo boycott, it was not criminal 
under Utan iaw ' 
Notwithstanding the specific language of the 
statute Gictaung the ase ot federal mteipreta-
tions and the objective of e'early delineating 
proscnoed conduct, the majority suggests that 
the Uun statute rejects me traditional tederal 
dennmon of the 'emi "group ooycott" m 
favor ot the "general definition of bovcott y% 
This concept, according to the majoruy, reiers 
to "a method ot pressuring a party with wnom 
one has a disoute oy withholding, or enlisting 
others to withhold, patronage or services trom 
the target '3 Even under this definition it is 
difficult to imagine now the benavior ot these 
defendants constitutes any kind of boycott 
witn antitrust implications Fletcher accented 
bribes rrom the defendants in this case so that 
thev wouid receive the UP&L becumv contr-
acts There was no disoute, no pressure, no 
enlistment of others to witnhold services, and 
no target tor elimination It is clear co me tnat 
even if the Legislature meant to have r re term 
* group oovcott' ^oustruea m a less rigid way 
than might cnaractenze the traditional redcrai 
view, it nonetneless intended to nave the term 
mean something reasonably concrete Minim-
ally, the benavior sought to be proscribed by 
the statute is behavior .vhicn can tairiy be 
descnoed as a srouo bovcott 
In my view, rvhat defendants aid cannot be 
characterized as a group bovcott in any sense. 
Defendants' excursion into the realm ot ant-
itrust was, at most, in the form ot an exclusive 
dealing arrangement \n exclusive dealing 
arrangement is a contract which involves a 
commitment by a buyer to deal oniv vith a 
particular seller L. Sullivan, HandbooK ot the 
Law or Antitrust 471 (1977) However, -»uch 
an arrangement does not constitute a per se 
violation of section I of the Sherman Act, see, 
e.g., Twin dty Sponservice, Inc. v Chanes 
O. Fmlev & Co , 676 F 2d 1291, 1304 rt.9 (<Hh 
Cir. 1982) (explaining Tampa Electric Co. v. 
Nasnville Coal Co , 365 U.S 320, SI S Ct 623 
(1963)), nor does it constitute a violation ot 
§76-10-920 ot the Utah Antitrust Act. 
The trial court accurately categorized the 
arrangement between Fletcher and the defen-
dants m this case as one of "exclusive 
dealing, * wrule at the same time stating that 
application of ' ru le of reason" analvsis4 
" vould result in an unconstitutional depriva-
tion ot defendant : rights to due process oi 
law 5 The majority uke vise admits that 'the 
rule ot reason has no pan in the criminal 
provisions of the Utah Antitrust Ac t / 
The majoruv, nowever, iargeiv avoids the 
implications of this conclusion by minimizing 
the nature of defendants behavior ana 
instead empnasizing then perceived state ot 
mind m doma wnat they aid. According to the 
majority, "the intent of the contract, comoi-
nation or consmracv is the deciding element" 
of criminality under this reasoning, even a 
purely vertical exclusive deanng contract — 
which both the majority ana the trial court 
acknowledge is not a "grouo oovcott" m the 
usual sense — can oe miraculously conve-
rted into a group bovcott, at least ot the Utah 
varietv, by prooi ot an anncomoetmve intent 
That is, as the trial court held, "an otnerwise 
legal business decision can become an unla-
wful group boycott under the Utah Antitrust 
Act . ' 
The effect of this aDproach is to render 
totailv ineffectual the Legislature's eifort to 
particularize but tour tammar, per se antitrust 
violations as uniawiul under §76-10-Q20, 
so that 'both the prosecutor and the commu-
nity at large' will ciearly know 'what conduct 
is criminally proscnoed." Dioble dc Jardine, The 
Utah Antitrust Act of 1979 Getting Into 
the State Antitrust Business, 1980 Utan L. 
Rev 73, 83 (emohasis added) 
3ut why else, the logic goes, would the 
Legislature inject a sDecmc mtent reamrement 
'pro in offense wruch '•as nistoncailv Seen 
thougnt so bad thai criminal intent can simoiy 
be presumed^ It is oovious to me that oy 
coupling an anticompetitive specific intent 
requirement with the group oovcott aspect ot 
§76-10-920, the Legislature did not mean 
to obscure the issue of wnat ;cinds ot benavior 
were proscnoed. Rather, the Legislature meant 
to avoid the 'contusion over the illegality of 
group boycotts and the governing standards/ 
id., by requinng that a readily identifiable 
group boycott be accompanied by an actual 
intent to eliminate competition See id. The 
specific intent requirement *as added to eli-
minate "the potentially problematic situation 
where a grouo bovcott exists out an anticom-
petitive motive does not." Id. The requirement 
was not added to allow tor a cnminai convi-
ction wtienever there is an anticompetitive 
motive regardless ot wrtether there is reallv a 
grouo boycott. I oeheve by adding a ^pecirc 
intent requirement the Legislature meant zo 
narrow, nor expand, the scope ot the group 
boycott enme in this state. 
SPECIFIC INTENT 
Even if the defendants engaged in conduct 
which might arguaolv consntute a group 
boycott in some oroad sense, I do not oeiieve 
they did so with the specific intent to eliminate 
For complete Utah Coue Annotations, consult CODt#Co's Annotation Service 
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competition as required bv the statute nor do i 
agree with trie majority that sucn intent can be 
.nterrcd trom the evidence 
Acccraing to tne maionty, anticompetitive 
intent "may be inferred from the deiendant's 
conduct and ^rcumstances." The maicntv 
points to the tact that the contract between 
UPiLL and defendants were not comoetuively 
bid as is the usual practice m selecting security 
comoames. This leads my colleagues to tne 
conclusion that the intent ot these aefendants 
was n o n e o t h e r t h a n to e l i m i n a t e 
" com petition. * 
If one looks at what defendants did and 
considers the market m which tney did u,& it is 
ODvtous thev had no intent to eliminate com-
petition. The trial court, in instructing the 
jury, narrowly defined the relevant market in 
this case as "among \enaors 01 secan'y guard 
services to Utah Power ana Light / notwiths-
tanding the tact that other secunty guard 
companies comoetins for the UP&L contract 
were <n$o competing *or contracts tnrougnout 
the state or even worldwide. However, there 
»vas no eviaence that tne security needs of 
UP&L were somehow so unique that guard 
service -/enacrs , o r r e * i n " Tzi ^P^LL': CIL.I-
ness ^vere necessanlv different — ana fewer -
- than guard service vendors generally, wno 
of course are aole to provide security services 
for everything trom large utilities to retail 
stores, apartments, warenouses, entireties, 
banks, and so on. Nor was there evidence to 
show tnac UP&L was such a major purcnaser 
in the focai security service market that failure 
to secure that contract would necessarily 
imperii anv of defendants' competitors. 
While it can perhaps be inferred that the 
defendants intended to eliminate otrer secunty 
companies from competition for tne UP&L 
contract, d sirnolv cannot be inferred that they 
intended to eliminate these companies from 
competition in any meamngiul marketplace, 
which is what the antitrust laws are designed 
to prevent. 'The Sherman Act was enacted to 
protect competition in the marketplace, it was 
not designed, and has never been interpreted. 
to reach ail business practices, unfair or oth-
erwise, damaging to individual companies." 
Cascade Cabinet Co v. Western Cabinet & 
Mill*ork. 710 F 2d 1366, 1374 (9th Cir. 1983). 
Other secunty companies were not hindered by 
defendants in competing for secunty guard 
contracts. They were merely depnved of the 
UP^cL contract. While this conduct is certainly 
not commenaaole,7 "the use ot unfair means 
resulting in the suostitution of one competitor 
for another without more does not violate the 
antitrust laws." \Ianutac:uring Rescarcn Com 
v. Greenlee Tool Co., 693 F.2d 1037, 1043 
( l l thCir . 1982). 
CONCLUSION 
Commercial bnbery does not criminally 
violate the Utah antitrust laws. Detendants' 
conduct does not constuute a group boycott. 
Even if defendants' conduct can somenow be 
shoenorned into rhe 'group ooycott" pigeon-
hole, there was no evidence to prove a specific 
intent to eliminate competition, and the fair 
mlerences point the other way. i wouid reverse 
the antitrust convictions ana remand for res-
entencing on the otner enmes for wnich aef-
endants were properly convicted. 
Gregorv SC. Orme, Judge 
1. Section 2(c) of the Robinson-Patman Art, 15 
U S C A 13(c) (1973), exoressty maxes accenting a 
"commission' *ithout performing real *onc in 
j connection with a sale ol gooos illegal unaer tederal 
I law 
2. The majority relies en federal cases rejecting the 
j "numerosuy7 reauirement ot grouD boycott tor the 
/iew that something less is now needed to constitute 
j a gToap ooycott vVhile it is true that tnese cases 
t have drooped the 'numerositv* requirement, i.e., 
concern about the number ot consoirators in a 
j horizontal reiationsmo, tney nonetneless still recuire 
the other elements oi a group oovcott: coneertsa 
reiusai to deal, enlistment ol otners". ana a target. See. 
e.g.. Com-Tel, Inc. v. Oukane Corp.,. 569 
F^d 404,414 (6th Or .982) 
3. Tils majonty suggests tnat a ooycott unaer une-r 
I 'general definition' differs trom the term grouo 
I ooycott as it evoivea unaer rhe per <e doctrine, 
j Ironically, their definition was taken from one oi 
the landmark cases deiirung a per sc illegal grouo 
bovcott. The definition extractea from the Supreme 
Court's opinion was one wnich the Court oriered to 
explain the term "boycott" in common parlance. St. 
I Paul Fire & Marine ins. Co. v Barry, 433 If.S 531, 
I 545-46(1978). 
i 4 Whereas grouo boycotts are suoject to a per se 
rule ot 'llegantv, exclusive dealing arrangements are 
J tested by a "rule or reason' standard. Twin Cty 
j Sportscrvics. Inc. v. Charles O. Finlev & Co , 676 | F 2d at 1302. The locus or this test is to first find a 
relevant market ana then assess wnether competition 
has been foreclosed in a substantial snare oi the 
j relevant market. Antitrust liability is not imposed 
without oroor of actual harm to competition The 
purpose ot tins test is to determine the anticompet-
itive "effects* ot the exclusive contract, *d . rather 
I than the anticompetitive * ntent* as requirea by the 
Utah statute. 
I 5 The memorandum decision is reprinted at Note, 
j Criminal Antitrust Action m Utah: Stats v Flcicncr, 
1 8 Y.U. J. Pub. L. 229. 251-55 (1986) The dec-
j lsion was written in the context of a denial ot a 
motion to dismiss. While the decision simply perm-
itted the state to proceed to try its caae bet ore a 
jurv, the trial court snared the majority's view that 
intent is the controlling element ot a 'grouo 
boycott* charge. 
The theme of the cases cited oy botn 
parties is that the mere existence oi an 
exclusive vertical contract is not a 
I 'group boycott* prombued bv the ant-
itrust *aws. However, the State nas 
I alleged and should be allowed to prove 
J "that the aefendants had specific antico-
j mpetitive intent. This can not be inte-
rred from the mere existence ot an -xc« 
lusive vertical deal, but by anucompcti-
For complete utan Code Annotations, conduit CODLACO'S Annotation :>crvice 
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live, lilegai behavior an otherwise legai 
business decision can become an unla-
wful group oovcott under ihz Utah 
Antitrust Act. The State should have the 
opportunity to establisn that the defen-
dants nad a bDecmc intent to eliminate 
access to the security guard mancet as 
the goai of their exclusive dealing and 
that no legitimate business purpose or 
result was intended. 
Id. at 254-sS. 
6. *[AJn antitrust policy divorced from market 
considerations would lacK anv objective benenm-
arks ' Conunentai T.V. Inc. v GTE Sylvanma. 
Inc., 433 U.S 36. 53 n 21 (1977) Contrary to tne 
rraioruv's characterization. I have not urged full-
blown market analysis or the ^ort typical wnen 
applying the rule or reason. Sucn analysis is indeed 
unnecessary wnere an antitrust violation of the per 
se vanetv is at issue However, I think a cursory 
peek at tne relevant market is instructive m evalua-
ting the likelihood that deiendants nad as tneir 
intent the elimination oi competition. ••"-* 
7. Fortunately, sucn objectionable conduct is readily 
pumsned under our commercial bribery statute. 
Where the conduct is especially egregious, it can 
also, as in this case, be reacned under tne racxetee-
nng statute Oerendants did a Dad thing and thev 
should suner the consequences. Their pumsnment. 
however, should be for iht crimes thsv committed, 
not those they might have committed had the Legi-
slature cnosen a different approacn to antitrust cri-
minality. 
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Defendant L. Brent Fletcher appeals from 
j his convictions on seven counts of bribery, one 
count of antitrust violation, and two counts of 
racketeering. This appeal was initially filed 
with the Utah Supreme Court and was trans-
ferred to this Court pursuant to R. Utah S.Ct. 
4A We affirm defendant's convictions. 
In the comoamon case, Stare v. Thomoson, 
11 Utah Adv. Rep. 34 (Ulan Ct. Apo.f Marcn 
9, 1988), also filed today, this Court disposed 
of deienaant's first two issues on appeal, 
I namely 1) the admissibility of evidence oota-
j ined pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §§77-22-
| 1 through -3 (1982), and 2) the sufficiency of 
| the evidence to allow multiple counts of 
' bribery to go to the jury. Therefore, we 
! address om\ defendant s third issue on 
appeai: whether the Utah Racketeering Influ-
. ences and Criminal Enterprise Act (the RICE 
A c t ) , Utah Coae Ann . ^§76-10-1601 
I througn -1608 (1981), was unconstitutionally 
applied ex post facto to defendant. 
i When this case was tried, section 76-10-
1603(1) provided: 
j It shall be uniawiul for anv person 
who has receneo any proceeds 
j denved, whether directly or mdire-
j ctly, from a pattern ot racketeering 
I activity in wnicn such person nas 
j participated, as a principal, to use 
or invest, directly or indirectly, anv 
j part of sucn proceeds, or the proc-
eeds derived irom the in vestment or 
use thereot, in the acouisition of 
any interest tn. or the establishment 
or operation of, any enterprise. 
A "pattern of racketeering activity" was 
defined in section 76-10-1602(4) as: 
engaging tn at least two episodes of 
racketeering conduct which have the 
same or similar objecives, -esults, 
participants, vtctims, or metnous of 
commission, or are otherwise inte-
rrelated by distinguishing characte-
ristics and are not isolated events, 
provided at least one of such epis-
odes occurred after fhe effective 
date of this pan and the !&t of 
which occurred within five years 
after the commission of a prior 
episode of racketeering conduct. 
Bribery was an act of racketeering under 
section 76-10-1602(I)(h). Defendant was 
charged witn one episode of racketeering act-
ivity occurring in 1983. He was convicted of 
seven counts of bribery, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. §76-6-J08(l)(b) (1978), occur-
ring between February 2S and May 27, 1983. 
Defendant was charged with another episode 
of racketeering activity occurring between 
I January 11 and Mav 15, 1979. Count \l oi 
I the second amended information alleged der-
endant participated in eight other acts of 
j bribery during this earlier period. All acts 
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AMENDMENTS 
TO THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 
AMENDMENT IV 
The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, .papers, 
and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be 
violated, and no Warrants ^hall issue, but upon probable cause, sup-
ported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to 
be searched, and the persons or things to be seized. 
AMENDMENT V 
No person shall be held to answer for a capital, or otherwise infamous 
crime, unless on a presentment or indictment of a Grand Jury, except 
in cases arising in the land or naval forces, or in the Militia, when in 
actual service iu time of War or public danger; nor shall any person 
be subject for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb; 
nor shall be compelled in any criminal ease to be a witness against 
himself, nor be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without due process 
of law; nor ->hall private property be taken for public use, without just 
compensation. 
AMENDMENT VIII 
Excessive bail &hall not be required, nor excessive fines imposed, nor 
cruel and unusual punishments inrlicted. 
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CONSTITUTION OF UTAH 
ARTICLE I 
DECLAKATION OF RIGHTS 
Sec. 7. [Due process of law.] 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due 
process of law. 
Sec. 9. [Excessive bail and fines—Cruel punishments.] 
Excessive bail .shall not be required; excessive fines shall not be im-
posed; nor shall cruel and unusual punishments be inflicted. .Persons 
arrested or imprisoned shall not be treated with unnecessary rigor. 
Sec. 12, [Eights of accused persons.] 
In criminal prosecutions the accused shall have the right to appear 
and defend in person and by counsel, to demand the nature and cause of 
the accusation against him, to have a copy thereof, to testify in his own 
behalf, to be confronted by the witnesses against him, to have compul-
sory process to compol the attendance of witnesses in his own behalf, 
to have a speedy public trial by an impartial jury- of the county or dis-
trict in which the offense is alleged to have been committed, and the 
right to appeal in ail cases. In no instance shall any accused person, 
before final judgment, be compelled to advance money or fees to secure 
the rights herein guaranteed. The accused shall not be compelled to 
give evidence against himself; a wife shall not be compelled to testify 
against her husband, nor a husband against his wife, nor shall any person 
be twice put in jeopardy for the same offense. 
Sec. 14. [Unreasonable searches forbidden—Issuance of warrant.] 
The right of riie people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers 
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures shall not be vio-
lated; and no warrant shall issue but upon probable cause supported by 
oath or affirmation, particularly describing the place to be searched, and 





76-10-911 Antitrust Act — Short title 
76-10-012. Legislative findings — Purpose ot* 
act. 
76-10-913. Definitions 
76-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities. 
76-10-915 Exempt activities. 
76-10-916. Attornev general's powers — In-
vestigations — Institution of 
actions — Cooperation. 
76-10-917. Civil ant i t rust investigations — 
Demand for documentary mate-
rial or information — Produc-
tion of documents — Oral ex-
amination — Judicial order for 
compliance — Confidentiality 
— Subpoenas precluded. 
76-10-918. Attorney general may brinjj ac-
tion tor injunctive relief, dam-
ages or civil penalty 
76-10-919. Person may bring action for in-
junctive relief and damages — 
COMMERCE 
Section 
Treble damages — Recovery of 
actual damages or civil penalty 
by state or political subdivi-
sions — Immunity of political 
subdivisions from damages, 
costs, or attorney's fees. 
76-10-920. Fine and/or imprisonment tor vio-
lation — Certain vertical agree-
ments exciuaed — Nolo conten-
dere. 
76-10-921. Conviction as prima facie evi-
dence in action for injunctive 
relief or damages. 
76-10-922. Antitrust revolving account. 
76-10-923. Attorney general to advocate com-
petition. 
76-10-924. Venue of actions by state — 
Transfer. 
76-10-925. Statute of limitations. 
76-10-926. Interpretation of act. 
76-10-911. Antitrust Act — Short title. 
This act shall be known, and may be cited, as the 'Utah Antitrust Act." 
Historv: C. 1953, To-10-911, enac ted bv L. 
1979, ch. 79, * 1. 
Cross -References . — Untair Practices Act. 
5* 13-V1 et sea 
Law Reviews . — Forum-Shopping in Ap-
pellate Review or FTC Cease ana j_)esist Or-
ders. 1968 Utan L Rev 316 
Antitrust Symposium, 19b9 Utah L Rev 
617 et seq 
The Utah Anti t rust Act ot 1979 Lxr tring into 
76-10-912. Legislative findings — Purpose of act. 
The legislature finds and determines that competition is fundamental to the 
free marKet system and that the unrestrained interaction of competitive 
forces will yield the best allocation of our economic resources, the lowest 
prices, the highest quaiitv and the greatest material progress, while at the 
same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation of our 
democratic, political and social institutions. 
The purpose of this act is, therefore, to encourage free and open competition 
in the interest of the general welfare and economv of this state by prohibiting 
monopolistic and untair trade practices, combinations and conspiracies in re-
straint of t rade or commerce and by providing adequate penalties for the 
enforcement of its provisions. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-912, e n a c t e d by L. 
1979, ch. 79, * 2. 
76-10-913. Definitions. 
As used in this act: 
(1) ' 'Attempt to monopolize" means action taken without a legitimate 
business puipose and with a specific intent ot destroying competition or 
controlling prices to substantially lessen competition, or creating a mo-
nopoly, where there is a dangerous probability of creating a monopoly. 
(2) "Commodity" includes any product of the soil, any article of mer-
chandise or trade or commerce, and any other kind of real or personal 
property 
(3) '"Manufacturer" means the producer or originator of any commodity 
or service. 
(4) "Service" includes any activity that is performed in whole or in part 
for the purpose of financial gain including, but not limited to, personal 
service, professional service, rental, leading or licensing for use. 
(5) "Truae or commerce' includes all economic activity involving, or 
relating to, any commodity, service, or business activity, including the 
cost of excnange or transportation. 
the State Antitrust Bubines.-,, 1980 Utah L. 
Rev 73 
A.L.R. — Propnetv under state law of 
manufacturer » nr bupoliers retusai to sell 
medical product to individual onvbician. nospi-
tal. or cimic 45 A L.R 4tn 1007 
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7G-10-914. Illegal anticompetitive activities. 
( I) Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or con-
spiracy in restraint of trade or commerce is declared to be illegal. 
< 2) It shall be unlawful for any person to monopolize, or attempt to monopo-
lize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monopolize, 
any part of trade or commerce. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-914, enac ted by L. 
1979, ch. 79, § 4. 
DECISIONS UNDER FORMER LAW 
ANALYSIS 
Agricultural cooperative association. 
Illegal price-control agreement of trade corporation. 
Proof of violation. 
Agr icu l tura l coopera t ive associa t ion . of information for bidding — and where the fee 
Suit by milk hauler against producers' asso- paid by the members was graduated upward 
ciation raised question for jury whether associ- based on the total bid by a member on a job. 
ation had urged members to use only its trans- and where the fee was understood to be in addi-
portation services to further its own legitimate tion to the actual job cost with the purpose in 
business interests or to enable it to fix mini-
 m i n ( j ot- c a r r y i n ? out an investment program 
mum milk prices; such conduct would be justi-
 f o r t h e m e m b e r s and paving dividends, the 
liable it for the former purpose, but unlawtui if
 a K r e e m e n t between the corporation and the 
for the tatter purpose Gammon v Federated
 m e m b e r s w a s a n l l l e „ a l price-controi agree-
Milk Producers Assn. (!%.>) L4 U 2d 291. 3h3
 m e n t a n d w a s a n u n r e a s o n a b l e restraint of 
trade and invalid as against public policy. 
Illegal pr ice-control ag reemen t of t r a d e Zion's Service Corp. v. Danieison v 1961) 12 U 
corpora t ion . 2d 369, :JG6 P 2d 982. 
Where a group of contractors organized a 
profit corporation which was to provide essen- Proof ot violat ion. 
tiai information involving the economics of Proof of combine, conspiracy or agreement 
their trade and included an agreement to em- was necessary to establish violation of former 
ploy a common agent to provide one essential law. Flinco. Inc. v. Goodyear Tire <& Rubber Co. 
service in bidding each joh — a common source (1965) 17 U 2d 173, 406 P 2d 911. 
76-10-915. Exempt activities. 
(1) No provision of this act shall be construed to prohibit: 
(a) The activities of any public utility to the extent that those activities 
are subject to regulation by the public service commission, the state or 
federal department of transportation, the federal energy regulatory com-
mission, the federal communications commission, the interstate com-
merce commission, or successor agencies; 
(b) The activities of any insurer, insurance agent, insurance broker, 
independent insurance adjuster or rat ing organization including, but not 
limited to, making or participating in joint underwriting or reinsurance 
arrangements, to the extent that those activities are subject to regulation 
by the commissioner of insurance; 
(c) The activities of securities dealers, issuers or igents, to the extent 
that those activities aie suoject to regulation under the laws oi either this 
state or the Unired States; 
(d) The activities of any state or national banking institution, to the 
extent that such activities are regulated or supervised by state govern-
ment officers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or by fed-
eral government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the 
United States; 
(e) The activities of anv state or federal savings and loan association to 
the extent that those activities are regulated or supervised bv ^tate gov-
ernment orficers or agencies under the banking laws of this state or fed-
eral government officers or agencies under the banking laws of the 
United States: or 
(f) The activities of a municipality to the extent authorized or directed 
by state law 
(2) The labor of a human being is not a commodity or article of commerce. 
Nothing contained in the anti t rust laws shall be construed to forbid the exis-
tence and operation of labor, agricultural or horticultural organizations, insti-
tuted for the purpose of mutual help and not having capital stock or conducted 
for profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations 
from lawfully carrying out the legitimate object thereof: nor shail such organi-
zations or membership in chem be held to be illegal comoinations or conspira-
cies m restraint of trade under the ant i t rust laws. 
Historv: C 195X 76-10-915, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 79, * 5. 
76-10-918. Attorney general 's powers — Investigations — 
Institution of actions — Cooperation. 
(1) The attorney general ^hall have authority to investigate suspected vio-
lations of this act and to institute appropriate actions regarding those sus-
pected violations as provided m this act. 
(2) Any violations of this act which may come to the attention of any state 
government officer or agency shail be reported to the attorney general. All 
state government otficers and agencies shall cooperate with, and assist in, any 
prosecution for violation )f this act. 
(3) The j t torney general bhall have the authority to proceed under any 
ant i t rust laws m the federal courts on behalf of this state or any of its political 
subdivisions or agencies 
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7o-I0-917. Civil antitrust investigations — Demand for 
documentary material or information — Produc-
tion of documents — Oral examination — Judi-
cial order tor compliance — Confidentiality — 
Subpoenas precluded. 
(1) Whenever the attorney general has reasonable cause to believe that any 
person may be in possession, custody, or control of any documentary material, 
or mav have any information relevant to a civil anti trust investigation, he 
may, prior to the institution of a civil proceeding thereon, issue ana cause to 
be served upon that person a written civil investigative demand requesting 
that person to produce such documentary material for inspection, copying or 
reproduction by the state where the documents are located or produced, to 
give oral testimony concerning documentary material or information, or to 
furnish any combination thereof. 
(2) (a) Each such demand shall state: 
(i) The nature of the activities constituting the alleged antitrust 
violation or the activities in preparation for a merger, acquisition, 
joint venture, or similar transaction which, if consummated, may 
result in a violation of this act which are under investigation and the 
provision of law applicable thereto; and 
<ii) That the recipient is entitled to counsel, that the documents, 
materials, or testimonv in response to the demand may be used in a 
civil or criminal proceeding, and that if the recipient does not comply 
with the demand the office of the attorney general may compel com-
pliance by appearance, upon reasonable notice to the recipient, before 
the district court in the judicial district wherein the recipient resides 
or does business and only upon a showing before rhat district court 
that the requirements of subsection w) have been met. 
(b) If the demand is one for production of documentary material, it 
shail also: 
(i) Describe the classes of documentary material to be produced 
thereunder with such definiteness and certainty as to permit the 
material to be fairly identified; 
(ii) Prescribe return dates which will provide a reasonable period 
of time within which the material demanded may be assembled and 
made available for inspection and reproduction; and 
(iii) Identify the individual at the attorney general's office to 
whom such material shall be made available. 
(c) If rhe demand is one for the giving of oral testimony, it shall also 
prescribe the date, time and place at which oral testimony shail be com-
menced and state that a member of the attorney general's office staff shall 
conduct the examination and that a copy of the transcript of such exami-
nation shail be submitted to and maintained by the office of the attorney 
general. 
(3) The civil investigative demand may be served upon any person who may 
be brought within the jurisdiction of any Utah court and shall be served upon 
the person in the manner provided for service of a subpoena. 
(4) The production of documentary material in response to a demand served 
pursuant to this section shail be made under an affidavit, in such form as the 
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demand designates, by the person, if a natural person, to whom the demand is 
directed or, if not a natural person, by a person or persons having knowledge 
of the facts and circumstances relating to such production, to the effect that 
all of the documentary material required by the demand and in the posses-
sion, custody, or control of the person to whom the demand is directed has in 
good faith been produced and made available to the office of the attorney 
general. 
(5) fa) The examination of any person pursuant to a demand for oral testi-
mony served under this section shall be taken before an officer authorized 
to administer oaths or affirmations by the laws of the United States or of 
the place where the examination is held. The officer before whom the 
testimony is to be taken shall put the witness on oath or affirmation and 
shall personally, or by someone acting under his direction and in his 
presence, record the testimony of the witness. The testimony shall be 
taken stenographieaily and transcribed. The officer before whom the tes-
timony is taken shail promptly transmit a copy of the transcript of the 
testimony to the office of the attorney general. 
(b) In the taking of oral testimony, ail persons other than personnel 
from the attorney general's office, the witness, counsel for" the witness, 
the officer before whom the testimony is to be taken, and any stenogra-
pher taking such testimony, snail be excluded from the place where the 
examination is held. 
(c) The oral testimony of any person taken pursuant to a demand 
served under this section shall be taKen in the county wherein such per-
son resides or transacts business or in such other place as may be agreed 
upon by the attorney general and such person. 
(d) When testimony is fully transcribed the transcript shall be certified 
by the officer before whom, the testimony was taken and submitted to the 
witness for examination and signing, in accordance with Rule 30(e) of the 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. A copy of the deposition shall be furnished 
free of charge to each such witness upon his request. 
(e) Any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testimony 
pursuant to this section may be accompanied, represented, and advised by 
counsel. Counsel may advise such person, in confidence, either upon the 
request of such person or upon counsel's own initiative, with respect to 
any question asked of such person. Such person or counsel may object on 
the record to any question, in whole or in part, and shall briefly state for 
the record the reason for the objection. An objection may properly be 
made, received, and entered upon the record when it is claimed that such 
person is entitled to refuse to answer the question on grounds of any 
constitutional or other legal right or privilege, including the privilege 
against self-incrimination, [f such person refuses to answer any question, 
the attorney general may petition the district court for an order compel-
ling such person to answer the question. 
(f) If any person compelled to appear under a demand for oral testi-
mony pursuant to this section refuses to answer any questions on grounds 
of the privilege against self-incrimination, the testimony of such person 
may be compelled as in criminal cases under section 77-45-2. 
(g) Any person appearing for oral examination pursuant to a demand 
served under this section shall be entitled to the same fees and mileage 
which are paid to witnesses in the district courts of the State of Utah. 
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Witness fees and expenses shall be tendered and paid as in any civil 
action. 
(6) The providing of anv testimony, documents or objects in response to a 
civil investigative demand issued pursuant to the provisions of this act shall 
be considered part of an official proceeding as defined m section 76-8-501. 
(7) If a person objects to, or otherwise fails to comply with the demand 
served upon him pursuant to this section, the attorney general may file in the 
district court of the county in which the person resides or does business, a 
petition for an order compelling compliance with the demand. Notice of hear-
ing of the petition and a copy of the petition s,hail be served upon the person, 
who may appear in opposition to the petition. If the court finds that the 
demand is proper, that there is reasonable cause to believe there has been a 
violation of this act, and that the information sought or document or object 
demanded is relevant to the violation, it shall order the person to comply with 
the demand, subject to such modifications as the court may prescribe. Upon 
motion by the person and for good cause shown, the court may make any 
further order in the proceedings that justice requires to protect the person 
from unreasonable annoyance, embarrassment, oppression, burden or ex-
pense. 
(8) Any procedure, testimony taken, or material produced under this sec-
tion shall be kept confidential by the attorney general unless ordered dis-
closed by the court for good cause shown or confidentiality is waived in writ-
ing by the person being investigated or the person who has testified or pro-
duced documents or objecLs. 
<9> Use of a civil investigative demand under this action precludes the 
invocation bv the attorney general of section 77-45-20. 
History: C. 195.'{, 7(»-l(M)l7, enac ted by L. Cross-References . — Witness fees and 
1971), ch. 79, * 7. mileage. *§ 21-5-4, 21-5-8, 21-5-10. 
Compi le r ' s Notes . — Sections 77-45-2 and Law Reviews. — The Utah Antitrust Act of 
77-45-20. referred tu in Subsections (5x0 and 1979: (letting into the State Antitrust Busi-
(9) were repealed in t9S0. For similar provi- ness, 1980 Utah L. Rev. 73, 88-94. 
sions in the present law, see Chapter .J2 oi Ti-
tle 77. 
76-10-918. Attorney general may bring action for injunc-
tive relief, damages or civil penalty. 
The attorney general may brint^ an action for appropriate injunctive relief, 
and for damages or a civil penalty in the name of the state or any of its 
political subdivisions or agencies for a violation of this act. The court may 
assess for the benefit of the state, a civil penalty of not more than $50,000 for 
each violation of the Utah Antitrust Act. 
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78-10-919. Person may bring action for injunctive relief 
and damages — Treble damages — Recovery of 
actual damages or civil penalty by state or politi-
cal subdivisions — Immunity of political subdivi-
sions from damages, costs, or attorney's fees. 
(1) (a) A person who is injured or is threatened with injury in his business 
or pronerty by a violation of the Utah Antitrust Act may bring an action 
for injunctive relief and damages 
(b) Subiect to the provisions of Subsections i3), (4), and (5), the court 
shall awara three times the amount of damages sustained, plus the cost of 
suit and a reasonable attorney s fee, in addition to granting anv appropri-
ate temporary, preliminary, or permanent injunctive relier 
(2) (a) If the court determines that a judgment in the amount of three times 
the damages awarded plus attorney's fees and costs will directly cause the 
msolvencv of the defendant, the court shall reduce the amount of judg-
ment to the highest sum that would not cause the defendants insolvency. 
(b) The court may not reduce a judgment to an amount less than the 
amount of damages sustained plus the costs oi .suit and a reasonable 
attorney's fee. 
(3) The state or any of its political subdivisions may recover the actual 
damages it sustains, or the civil penaltv provided by the Utah Antitrust Act, 
in addition to injunctive relief, costs of >,uit, and a reasonable aitomev h fee. 
(4) No damages, costs, or a t torneys fee may be recovered under this sec-
tion: 
(a) from any political subdivision; 
(b) from the official or employee of any political subdivision acting m 
an official capacity; or 
(c) against any person based on anv official action directed bv a politi-
cal subdivision or its official or employee acting in an official capacity 
(5) (a) Subsection (4) does not apply to cases filed before April 27, 1987, 
unless the defendant establishes and the court determines that m light of 
all the circumstances, including the posture of litigation and the avail-
ability of alternative relief, it would be inequitable not to apply Subsec-
tion (4) to a pending case. 
(b) In determining the application of Subsection (4), existence of a jury 
verdict, court judgment, or any subsequent litigation, is prima facie evi-
dence that Subsection t4) is not applicable. 
History: C. 1953. 76-10-911), enac ted by L. 
1979, ch. 79. * 9; L. 1984, ch. i9, * 2; 1987, 
ch. 13, * I. 
Compi le r ' s Notes . — The 1984 intendment 
deleted ' nuudmg the atate or anv ot its nauti-
cal itwdivisions or agencies" after ' \ person ' 
in un^ec <l). and '-ewrote sunder (3) which 
read: 'Neither the state nor anv of its political 
subdivisions or agencies shall recover more 
than the amount of damages sustained by rea-
son oi a violation or ihis together with costs of 
auit ind l /easonaoie l t tornevs tee 
The 1987 amendment divided the provisions 
of former Subjection i l) into present Subsec-
tions a Ma) and (1Kb), substituting 'the Utah 
Antitrust Act" for this a r t ' and deleting ' ip-
propna te ' following 'an action for' and "and 
the court shall" following 'and damage1- ' in 
Subjection i l)(a» and substituting Subventions 
(3), <4). <md «5»." for "Subsection i.i»". inserting 
'•he touit snail uwaid three times the amount 
of damages sustained, plus the <ost or suit and 
a reasonable at torneys fee' and deleting 
"awaid three times the amount ot damages 
sustained, plus the costs ot suit and a reason-
able attornev s tee" following 'permanent in-
junctive relict" in Subsection <l)(hi, divided 
the provisions or tormer Subsection i2) into 
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present Subsections t'iMa) and (jMh), makinu to prevent merger or acquisition alle^ediv pro-
minor chanuc-s throughout (ho.se provisions. hthited under ^ 7 ot" the Act (15 USCS i> 18), 
and added present Subsections (4) and (f>». 78 A.L.R. Fed. 159. 
Law Reviews. — A ^urvev of Injunctive Ke- What constitutes impairment of proposed in-
iief Under State AIU\ Federal Antitrust Laws. tervenor's interest to support intervention as 
-John J. Flvnn. t9r>7 L'tah L. Kev. .'J44. matter or" ntfht under Rule li4(«i)i2) ot Federal 
A.L.R. — Divestiture as available relief un- Rules ot Civil Procedure in anti trust actions, 
der * 1G ot C'.avton Act ( l.r> l-SCS v 2()> in ac- 78 A.L.R. Fed. U8f). 
tion by private parties. 77 A.L.R. Fed. 509. Propriety of preliminary injunctive relief in 
Standing of private party under «? 16 of private anti trust actions involving dealership 
Clayton Act ( 15 USCS Ji 2t>) to seek injunction terminations, 79 A.L.R. Fed. 14. 
DKCISIONS UNDKR FORMER LAW 
Requ i remen t s for recovery of t reble dam- the acts constituting such violation proKi-
aiics. malelv caused the damages. Recovery was iim-
[n an action to recover treble damages for ited to those at whom the violation was di-
injuries compensable under (he former ami- rectly aimed or those who had been directly 
trust statutes, piaintitf had to establish a viola- harmed. (Jummon v. Federated Milk Producers 
tion of the anti-trust provisions and also that Assn. (1963) 14 U 2d 291, t>83 P 2d 402. 
76-10-920, Fine and/or imprisonment for violation — Cer-
tain vertical agreements excluded — Nolo con-
tendere-
1(1)1 Any person who violates section 76-10-914 by price fixing, bid rigging, 
agreeing among competitors to divide customers or territories, or by engaging 
in a group boycott with specific intent of eliminating competition shall be 
punished, if an individual, by a fine not to exceed $50,000 or by imprisonment 
for an indeterminate time not to exceed one year, or both or, if by a person 
other than an individual, a fine not to exceed $100,000. The foregoing shall 
not be construed to include vertical agreements between a manufacturer, its 
distributors or their subdistributors dividing customers and territories solely 
involving the manufacturer's commodity or service where the manufacturer 
distributes its commodity or service both directly and througii distributors or 
subdistributors in competition with itself. 
(2) A defendant may plead nolo contendere to a charge brought under this 
title but only with the consent of the court. Such a plea shall be accepted by 
the court only after due consideration of the views of the parties and the 
interest of the public m the effective administration of justice. 
History: C. 195:;. 7H-10-920. onacted l>y f,. 1979- Getting info the State Antitrust Bust-
1979, c-h. 79, * 10. ness, 1980 Utah L. Uev. 7:5. o2-Hf>. 
Law Reviews. —The Utah Antitrust Act of 
76-10-921. Conviction as prima facie evidence in action for 
injunctive relief or damages. 
In any action brought by the M.ate. a final judgment or decree determining 
that a person has criminally violated this act, other than a judgment entered 
pursuant to a nolo contendere plea or a decree entered prior to the taking of 
any testimony, shall be prima facie evidence against that person in any action 
brought pursuant to section 76-10-919, as to all matters with respect to which 
the judgment or decree would be an estoppel between the parties thereto. 
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76-10-922. Antitrust revolving account. 
(1) There is created within the general fund an account to be known as the 
' 'antitrust revolving account" for the purpose of providing funds to pay for any 
costs and expenses incurred by the attorney general in relation to actions 
under state or federal anti trust laws, which account shall lapse only to the 
extent that it exceeds the sum of one million dollars. 
l2) All monies received by the state or its agencies by reason of any judg-
ment, settlement, or compromise as the result of any such action commenced 
by the attorney general, after payment of any costs or fees allocated by the 
court, shall be deposited to the antitrust revolving-account except as other-
wise provided in this section. 
(3) The legislature may make annual appropriations to the attorney gen-
eral from the anti trust revolving account or from the general fund, to such 
extent as may be required for the administration and enforcement of the 
ant i t rust laws. These funds shall be in addition to such other funds as may be 
appropriated to the attorney general for the administration and enforcement 
of the laws of this state. 
(4) Any monies recovered by the attorney general based on an expenditure 
or loss from a specific cash fund shall be credited to that fund to the extent of 
the expenditure or loss. Any monies recovered by the attorney general on 
behaif of any private person or public body other than the state shaii be paid 
to such persons or bodies. However, prior to any such credit or payment, any 
expenses advanced by the attorney general in any of the above actions shall 
be credited to the anti trust revolving account. 
History: C. 1953, 7G-10-922, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 79, 5 12. 
76-10-923. Attorney general to advocate competition. 
The attorney general shall have the authority and responsibility to advo-
cate the policy of competition before all political subdivisions of this state and 
all public agencies whose actions may affect the interests of persons in this 
state. 
History. C. 1953, 76-10-923. enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 79, $ 13. 
76-10-924. Venue of actions by state — Transfer. 
Any action brought by the state pursuant to this act shall be brought in any 
county wherein the defendant resides or does business, or at the option of the 
defendant, such action shall be transferred, upon motion made within 30 days 
after commencement of the action, to Salt Lake County. 
History: C. 1953. 76-10-924, enacted by L. 
1979, eh. 79, $ 14. 
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78-10-925. Statute of limitations. 
(1) Any action brought-by the attorney general pursuant to this act is 
barred if it is not commenced within four years atter the cause of action 
accrues. 
(2) Any other action pursuant to this act is barred if it is not commenced 
within iour years after the cause of action accrues, or within one year after the 
conclusion of an action brought by the state pursuant to this act based in 
whole or in part on any matter complained ^tln the subsequent action, which-
ever is the latter. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-925, enacted by L. 
1979, ch. 79, 4 15, 
76-10-926. Interpretation of act. 
The legislature intends that the courts, in construing this act, will be 
guided by interpretations given by the federal courts to comparable federal 
anti trust s tatutes and by other state courts to comparable state antitrust 
statutes. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-926. enacted by L. Repealing Clause. 
1979, ch. 79. * 16. Section 17 of Laws 1979. uh. 79 provided: 













Violation a felony — Costs — 
Forreiture — Fines — Divesti-
ture — Restrictions — Dissolu-
tion or reorganization —- Re-
straining orders and injunc-
tions — Hearings — Special 
verdict — Findings — Judg-
ment and ovder ot iorie\tur^ — 
Seizure ol Drooerty — Sale — 
Proceeds— Petitions tor remis-
sion or mitigation of forfeiture 
— Hearing — Disposition 








Remedies of person injured bv a 
pattern or uniawtul activity — 
Double damages — Coses, in-
cluding attorney s fee — Arbi-
tration — Agency — Burden or 
proof — Actions by attorney 
general or county attorney — 
Dismissal — Statute ot limita-
tions — Authonzea orders ot 
district court 
Repealed. 
Evidentiary value of criminal 
judgment m civil proceeding 
Severamhty clause 
Prospective aopiication. 
76-10-1601. Short title. 
This act is the "Pattern of Unlawtul Activuy Act." 
Historv: C. 19.13. 76-10-1601. enac ted bv 
L. 1081, en. 94, * I; L. 1985, ch. ^34. <j 1; 
1987, ch. 238, ^ i. 
Compi le r ' s Notes . — The 19S5 amendment 
suostituted is known ' for '^hall be known and 
mav be cited " 
The i9b7 amendment substituted "the 'Pat-
tern ot Uniawtul Activity Act ' tor "known as 
the Utah Racketeering fnfluences and Ciimi-
nai Enterprise Act 
The pnrase this act ' , as used in this section, 
means Laws L987 :n, 238, O 1 to 7, vvhicn 
appear as >»* 76-10-lbOl to 76-10-1603 5, 
76-10-1605, 76-10-1608 and 76-10-1609. 
Publ ic access to compla in t . 
Detendants who alleged that their prosecu-
tion under Racketeer Influenced and Criminal 
Enterprises Act, 18 U S C.A * 19bl and this 
Utan counterpart to that statule was intended 
merely to intimidate them and that the com-
plaint should therefore remain sealed did not 
overcome the common law right and interest in 
public ^ccess to the complaint wan a sutFicient 
showing of puvate or public harm. Huntsman-
Chnstensen Coip v Enti ma Indus , inc , 6i9 
F. Supp 733 (D. Utah 1986) 
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78-10-1602, Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Unlawful activity"' means to directly engage in conduct or to so-
licit, request, command, encourage, or intentionally aid another person to 
engage in conduct which would constitute any offense described by the 
following crimes or categories of crimes, or to attempt or conspire to 
engage in an act which would constitute any of those offenses, regardless 
of whether the act is in fact charged or indicted by any authority or is 
classified as a misdemeanor or a felony: 
(a) assault or aggravated assault, .45 76-5-102 and 76-5-103; 
(b) terroristic threat, S 76-5-107; 
(c) criminal homicide, S§ 76-5-201, 76-5-202. and 76-5-203: 
(d) kidnapping or aggravated kidnaDping, §§ 76-5-301 and 
76-5-302: 
(e) arson or aggravated arson, §§ 76-6-102 and 76-6-103; 
(0 causing a catastrophe, § 76-6-105; 
(g) burglary or aggravated burglary, 3§ 76-6-202 and 76-6-203: 
(h) burgiary of a vehicle, S 76-6-204; 
(\) manufacture or possession of an instrument for burglary or 
theft, $ 76-6-205: 
(j) robbery or aggravated robbery, S§ 76-6-301 and 76-6-302: 
(k) theft, .4 76-6-404; 
(1) theft bv deception, § 76-6-405: 
Cm) theft by extortion, 5 76-6-406: 
(n) receiving stolen property, ^ 76-6-408; 
(o) theft of services, § 76-6-409; 
(pj forgery, 9 76-6-501; 
(q) fraudulent use of a credit card, S§ 76-6-506.1, 76-6-506.2, and 
76-6-506.4: 
(r) computer fraud, Part 7, Chapter 76, Title 6: 
(s) bribery or receiving bribe by person in the business of selection, 
appraisal, or criticism of goods, S 76-6-508; 
(t) bribery of a labor official, $ 76-6-509; 
(u) defrauding creditors, § 76-6-511; 
(v) acceptance of deposit by insolvent financial institution, 
§ 76-6-512; 
(w; unlawful dealing with property by fiduciary, ^ 76-6-513; 
(x) bribery or threat to influence contest, 5 76-6-514; 
(y) making a false credit report, 3 76-6-517; 
(z) criminal simulation, $ 76-6-518; 
(aa) criminal usury, $ 76-6-520; 
(bb) false or fraudulent insurance claim, 5 76-6-521; 
(cc) sale of a child, ^ 76-7-203; 
(dd) bribery to influence official or political actions, 5 76-8-103; 
(ee; threats to influence official or political action, § 76-8-104: 
(ff) receiving bribe or bribery by public servant, § 76-8-105; 
(gg) receiving bribe or bribery for endorsement of person as public 
servant. $ 76-8-106; 
ihh) official misconduct, a§ 76-8-201 and 76-8-202; 
(ii) obstructing justice, § 76-8-306; 
(jp acceptance of bribe or bribery to prevent criminal prosecution, 
§ 76-8-306. 
(kk^ taise or inconsistent material statements. } 76-8-502, 
(11) raise or inconsistent statements, ^ 76-8-503; 
(mm) written false statements, > 76-8-504; 
inn) tampering with a witness, retaliation against a witness or 
informant", or bribery, > 76-8-508; 
(oo) extottion or bribery to dismiss criminal proceeding, 
* 76-8-509, 
(pp> tampering with evidence, ^ 76-8-510; 
(qq) intentionally or knowingly causing one animal to tight with 
another. Subsection 76-9-301(l;lf): 
(rr1 aelivery to common carrier, mailing, or placement on premises 
of an infernal machine, ^ 76-10-307; 
iss) construction or possession of internal machine, § 76-10-308; 
(tt) possession of a deadly weapon with intent to assauit, 
§ 76-10-507, 
(uu) unlawful marking of pistol or revolver, } 76-10-521; 
(vv) alteration of number or mark on pistol or revolver, 
§ 76-10-522: 
(ww) forging or counterfeiting trademarks, trade name, or trade 
device, * 76-10-1002, 
(xx) selling goods under counterfeited trademark, trade name, or 
trade devices, } 76-10-1003, 
(yy) sales in containers bearing registered t rademark of substi-
tuted articles, * 76-10-1004* 
(zz) selling or dealing with article bearing registered trademark or 
service mark with intent to defraud, ^ 76-10-1006; 
(aaa) sampling, * 76-10-1102: 
(bbb) gambling iraud. ^ 76-10-1103, 
(ceo gamohng promotion, } 76-10-1104: 
(ddd) possessing a gambling device or record, 5 76-10-1105; 
(eee) confidence game, ^ 76-10-1109; 
(fff) distributing pornographic material. $ 76-10-1204; 
(g%g> inducing acceptance of pornographic material, s1 76-10-1205; 
(hhh) dealing in harmtul material to a minor, } 76-10-1206, 
(iii) distribution of pornographic films, 4 76-10-1222; 
(jjj) indecent public displays, > 76-10-1228; 
(kkk) prostitution, <s 76-10-1302: 
(lib -aiding prostitution. <* 76-10-1304: 
(mmm) exploiting prostitution, ^ 76-10-1305: 
(nnn) aggravated exploitation of prostitution, ^ 76-10-1306; 
(ooo) sexual exploitation of a minor, 1 76-5a-3: 
(ppp> communications fraud, > 76-10-1801; 
(qqq) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 37, 
Title 58, the Utah Controlled Substances Act, or Chapter 37b, Title 
58, the Imitation Controlled Substances Act; 
(rrr* any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 1, 
Title 61, the Utah Uniform Securities Act: 
(sss) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 11, 
Title 57, the Land and Tirneshare Saies Practices Act; 
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(ttt) false claims for public assistance, 5 55-15a-31; 
(uuu) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 56, 
Title 63, the Utah Procurement Code; 
(vvv) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of the laws 
governing taxation in this state; 
(www) any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 12, 
Title 32a, the Alcoholic Beverage Control Act; 
(xxxJ any act prohibited by the criminal provisions of Chapter 10, 
Title 13, the Recording Practices Act; 
(yyy) deceptive business practices, S 76-6-507: and 
(zzz) any act illegal under the laws of the United States and enu-
merated in Title 18, Section 1961 (I) (B), (C), and (D) of the United 
States Code. 
(2) ffEnternrise?' means any individual, sole proprietorship, partner-
ship, corporation, business trust, association, or other legal entity, and 
any union or group of individuals associated in fact although not a legal 
entity, and includes illicit as well as licit entities. 
(3) "Pattern of unlawful activity'' means engaging in conduct which 
constitutes the commission of at least three episodes of unlawful activity, 
which episodes are not isolated, but have the same or similar purposes, 
results, participants, victims, or methods of commission, or otherwise are 
interrelated by distinguishing characteristics. Taken together, the epi-
sodes shall demonstrate continuing unlawful conduct and be related ei-
ther to each other or to the enterprise. At least one of the episodes com-
prising a pattern of unlawful activity shall have occurred after July 31, 
1981. The most recent act constituting part of a pattern of unlawful activ-
ity as defined by this part shail have occurred within tive years of the 
commission of the next preceding act alleged as part ot the pattern. 
(4) "Person" includes any individual or entity capable of holding a iegal 
or beneficial interest in property, including state, county, and locai gov-
ernmental entities. 
History: C. 195.'}. 76-10-1602. enac ted by amended by Laws 1985, ch. 234, $ 2, relating 
L. 1087, ch. 2,'J8, $ 2. to definitions, and enacts the present section. 
C o m p i l e r s Notes . — Laws 1987, ch. 2:58, „ . , . , , , „ „ , .
 u , 
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76-10-1603. Unlawful ac ts . 
(1) It is unlawful for any person who lias received any proceeds derived. 
whether directly or indirectly, from a pattern of unlawful activity in which 
the person has participated as a principal, to use or invest, directly or indi-
rectly, any part of that income, or the proceeds of the income, or the proceeds 
derived from the investment or use of those proceeds, in the acquisition of any 
interest in, or the establishment or operation of, any enterprise. 
(2) It is unlawful for any person through a pattern of unlawful activity to 
acquire or maintain, directly or indirectly, any interest in or control of any 
enterprise. 
(3) It is unlawful for any person employed by or associated with any enter-
prise to conduct or participate, whether directly or indirectly, in the conduct of 
that enterprise s affairs through a pattern of unlawful activity. 
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(4) It is unlawful for any person to conspire to violate any provision of 
Subsection < 1), i2), or to). 
History: C. 1953. ; 76-10-1603, enac ted by amended by Laws 1985, ch. 234. ^ 3, relating 
L. 1987, ch. — .*>8. ^ 3. to uniawtui acts, felony, and forfeitures, and 
Compi ler ' s Notes . — Laws 1987, ch 238. enacts the present section. 
^ 3 repeals iormer ^ 76-10-1603. as last 
ANALYSIS 
Oonsniracv 
Pattern of racketeering activitv 
Consp i racy . P a t t e r n of r acke t ee r ing act ivi tv. 
Althougn conspiracy is one of the enum°r- A pattern of racketeering activity requires 
ated acts or racketeering under ^ 76-I0-ln02. more than the mere commission oi two or more 
it is not a separate bjsi^ tjr recovery under episodes of racketeering conduct within live 
thib section but 13 merely a crime that mav years ot eacn other To torm a "pa t t e rn / the 
qualify as» one <jf the predicate acts needed to commission of predicate acts or episodes of 
bhow a pattern of racketeering activity; stand- criminality must be sufficiently continuous 
imj alone, a cnaree of conspiracy uoes not state d n d interrelated. That is. a 'pattern ' requires 
a cause ot action under this section. Bacne planned, ongoing continuing crime and the 
Haisev Stuart Shields, Inc. v. Tracv Collm* t h r e a c o f continuum criminal conduct, as OD-
Bank & Trust Co. (D. Utah 1983) 558 FSupp P 0 a e d to sporadic, isolated criminal episodes or 
JQ49 events. Cook v Ziuns First Nat'l BanK, 645 r\ 
Supp. ^23 (D. Utah 1986). 
76-10-1603.5. Violation a feiony — Costs — Forfeiture — 
Fines — Divestiture — Restrictions — Dissolution 
or reorganization — Restraining orders and in-
junctions — Hearings — Special verdict — Find-
ings — Judgment and order of forfeiture — Sei-
zure of property — Sale — Proceeds — Petitions 
for remission or mitigation of forfeiture — Hear-
ing — Disposition. 
(1) A person who violates any provision of § 76-10-1603 is guilty of a second 
decree felony. In addition to penalties prescribed by law, the court may order 
the person found guilty of the felony to pay to the state, if the attorney general 
brought the action, or to the county, if the county attorney brought the action, 
the costs of investigating and prosecuting the offense and the costs of securing 
the forfeitures provided for in this section. The person shall forfeit to the state 
or the county: 
(a) anv interest acquired or maintained in violation of any provision of 
§ 76-10-1603; 
(b) any interest in, security of, claim against, or property or 
contracturai right of any kind affording a source of influence over any 
enterprise which the person has established, operated, controlled, con-
ducted, or participated in the conduct of in violation of § 76-10-1603; and 
(c) any property constituting or derived from any proceeds which the 
person obtained, directly or indirectiv, from the conduct constituting the 
pattern of unlawful activity or from any act or conduct constituting the 
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pattern of unlawful activity proven as part of the violation of any provi-
sion of v 76-10-1603 
•2) If a violation of ^ 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity 
consisting of acta or conduct m violation of 4 76-10-1204. 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the property subject to forfeiture under this section 
is limited to property, the seizure ur forfeiture of which wouid not constitute a 
prior restraint on the exercise of an affected party's rights under the First 
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, Sec. 15 of the 
Utan Constitution, or would not otherwise unlawfully interfere with the exer-
cise of those righto 
\3) In lieu of a line otherwise authorized by law for a violation of 
> 76-10-1603, a derendant who derives profits or other proceeds from a con-
duct prohibited bv $ 76-10-1603, mav oe fined not more than twice the 
amount of the gross profits or other proceeds. 
(4) Except under Subsection (2), property subject to criminal forfeiture un-
der uhis section includes: 
<a) real property, including things growing on. affixed to, and found in 
land: and 
ib) tangible and intangible personal property including money, rights, 
privileges, interests, claims, and securities of any kind: 
(c) but does not include property legitimately exchanged for services 
rendered in connection with a defendant's exercise of his rights under the 
Sixtn Amendment to the Constitution of the United States and the ngnt 
to appear and be defended bv counsel in criminal prosecutions guaranteed 
by Article L Sec. 12 of the Utan Constitution. 
«5) Upon conviction for violating any provision of $ 76-10-1603, and in 
addition to anv penalty prescribed by law and m addition to any forfeitures 
provided for :n this section, the court mav do anv or ail of the following: 
<a) oraer \he person to divest himseif of any interest in or any control, 
direct or 'ndirect. of any enterprise; 
(b) impose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or invest-
ments of any person, including prohibiting the person from engaging in 
the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in, to the extent the 
Utan Constitution and the Constitution of the United States permit; or 
(
o order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise. 
(6) If a violation of i 76-10-1603 is based on a pattern of unlawful activity 
consisting of acts or conduct in violation or 5 76-10-120 4, 76-10-1205, 
76-10-1206, or 76-10-1222, the court may not enter any order that wouid 
amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected parcv s rights under 
the First Amendment to the Constitution of the United States or Article I, 
Sec. 15 of the Utah Constitution. 
(7) <a) All rights, title, and interest in forfeitable property described m 
Subsections (1) and (2) vest in the state if the action was brougnt by the 
attorney general or in the county if the action was brought by a county 
attorney, upon the commission of the act or conduct giving rise to the 
forfeiture under this section. 
(b) Any forfeitable property that is subsequently transferred to a per-
son other than the defendant may be the subject of a special proceeding 
and an order that the property be forfeited ro the state or the county, 
unless tne transferee estaolishes in a hearing held under Subsection U4> 
that he is a bona fide purchaser for value of the property wno at the time 
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of purchase reasonably believed that the property was not subject to for-
feiture under this section. 
(8) (a) Upon application of the attorney general or the county attorney, the 
court may enter restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of 
satisfactory performance bonds, or take any other action to preserve for 
forfeiture under this section any forfeitable property described in Subsec-
tions (1) and (2): 
(i) upon filing of an indictment or an information charging a viola-
tion of 5 76-10-1603 and alleging that the property with respect to 
which the order is sought would, in the event of conviction, be subject 
to forfeiture under this section; or 
(ii) prior to the filing of the indictment or information, if, after 
notice to persons appearing to have an interest in the property ana 
after affording them an opportunity for a hearing, the court deter-
mines that: 
(A) there is a substantial probability that the state will pre-
vail on the issue of forfeiture and that failure to enter the order 
will result in the prouerty being sold, distributed, exhibited, de-
stroyed, or removed from the jurisdiction of the court, or other-
wise made unavailable for forfeiture; and 
(B) the need to preserve the availability of the property or 
prevent its sale, distribution, exhibition, destruction, ur removal 
through the entry of the requested order outweighs the hardship 
on any party against whom the order is to be entered: 
(iii) an oraer entered under Subsection (ii) is effective for no more 
than 90 days, unless extended by the court for good cause shown or 
uniess an indictment or information as described in Subsection ii) has 
been filed. 
(b) A temporary restraining order may be entered upon application of 
the attorney general or a county attorney without notice or opportunity 
for a hearing, when an information or indictment has not yet been filed 
with respect to the property, if the attorney general or county attorney 
demonstrates that there is probable cause to believe that the property 
with respect to which the order is sought would, in the event of convic-
tion, be subject to forfeiture under this section and that provision of notice 
would jeopardize the availability of the property for forfeiture or wouid 
jeopardize an ongoing criminal investigation. The temporary order ex-
pires not more than ten days after it is entered uniess extended for good 
cause shown or uniess the party against whom it is entered consents to an 
extension. A hearing concerning an order entered under this subsection 
shall be held as soon as possible, and prior to the expiration of the tempo-
rary order. 
(c) The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of Evidence regarding 
evidence it may receive and consider at any hearing held under this 
subsection. 
(9) ia) Upon conviction of a person for violating any provision of 
§ 76-10-1603, the jury, if the case was tried to a jury, shall be instructed 
and asked to return a special verdict as to whether any of the property 
identified in the information or indictment is forfeitable under Subsec-
tions 76-10-1603.5(1) and (2). 
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«b) If the case is tried without a mrv, the jud^e shall make specific 
written findings if he determines that the property identified in the infor-
mation or indictment is forfeitable under Subsections 76-10-1603.5(1) and 
<2). Whether property is forfeitable shall be proven beyond a reasonable 
doubt. 
(10) (a; Upon conviction of a person for violating any provision of 
S 76-10-1603 and upon the jury's special verdict or the judge's finding 
that the property is forfeitable, the court shall enter a judgment ana order 
of forfeiture of the property to the state or the county ana shall authorize 
the attorney general or the county attorney to seize all property ordered 
forfeited upon the terms stated by the court in its order. Following the 
entry of an order declaring property forfeited, the court mav, upon appli-
cation ot the attorney general or the county attorney, enter approonate 
restraining orders or injunctions, require the execution of satisfactory 
performance bonds, appoint receivers, conservators, appraisers, accoun-
tants, or trustees, or take any other action to protect the interest of the 
state or countv m property ordered forfeited. 
(b) Anv income accruing to, or derived from, an enterprise or an inter-
est in an enterprise or Droperty which has been ordered forfeited under 
this section may be used to offset ordinary and necessary expenses to the 
enterprise which are required by law, or which are necessary to protect 
the interests of the state or county or third parties. 
(11) (a) After seizure of property ordered forfeited under this section, the 
attorney general or the countv attorney shall direct the disposition of the 
property by sale or any other commercially feasible means, making provi-
sion for the rights of any innocent persons. Any property right or interest 
not exercisable by or transferable for ^alue to the state or the county, 
expires and does not revert to the defendant. The defendant or any person 
acting in concert with or on behalf of the defendant is not eligible to 
purchase forfeited property at any sale held by the attorney general or the 
county attorney. 
(b) The court may restrain or stay the sale or disposition of the prop-
erty pending the conclusion of any appeal of the criminal case giving rise 
to the forfeiture, if the applicant demonstrates that proceeding with the 
sale or disposition of the property would result in irreparable injury, 
harm, or loss to him. 
(c) The proceeds of any sale or other disposition of property forfeited 
under this section and any moneys forfeited may be used first to pay 
expenses of the forfeiture and the sale, including expenses of seizure, 
maintenance, and custody of the property pending its disposition, adver-
tising, and court costs. 
(12) Regarding property ordered forfeited under this section, the attorney 
general or the county attorney may: 
(a) grant petitions for mitigacion or remission of forfeiture, restore for-
feited property to victims of a violation of this chapter, or take any other 
action to protect the rights of innocent persons m the interest of justice 
and as is consistent with the provisions of this section; 
(b) compromise claims arising under this section; 
(c) award compensation to persons providing information resulting in a 
forfeiture under this section; 
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(d) direct the disposition by the state or the county of ail property 
ordered forfeited under this section by public sale or any other commer-
cially feasible means, making provision for the rights of innocent persons: 
(e) destroy or otherwise dispose of property determined to be obscene 
or pornographic; and 
(f) take appropriate measures necessary to safeguard and maintain 
property ordered forfeited under this section pending its disnosition. 
113) Except under Subsection (16), a party claiming an interest m property 
subject to forfeiture under this section: 
(a) may not intervene in a trial or appeal of a criminal case involving 
the forfeiture of property under this section; and 
ib) may not commence an action at law or equity against the state or 
the county concerning the validity of his alleged interests in the property 
subsequent to the filing of an indictment or an information alleging that 
the prooerty is subject to forfeiture under this section. 
(14) The district court of the state which has jurisdiction of a case under 
this part may enter orders under this section without regard to location of any 
property which may be subject to forfeiture under this section, or which has 
been ordered forfeited under this section. 
(15) To facilitate the identification or location of property declared forfeited 
and to facilitate the disposition of petitions for remission or mitigation of 
forfeiture, after the entry of an order declaring propertv forfeited to the state 
or county, the court may. upon application of the attorney general or the 
^ouncv attorney, ;rde^ rh.-M, the testimony of anv witness relating to ihe proo-
erty forfeited be taken oy deposition, and tnac any oootc, paper, document, 
record, recording, or other material not privileged shall be produced as pro-
vided for depositions and discovery under the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
(16) (a) Following the entry of an order of forfeiture under this section, the 
attorney general or the county attorney shall publish notice of the order 
and of its intent to dispose of the property as the court may direct. The 
attorney general or the county attorney may also provide direct written 
notice to any person known to have an alleged interest in the property 
subjecc to the order of forfeiture, as a substitute for published notice as to 
those persons so notified. 
(b) Any person, other than the defendant, asserting a legal interest m 
property which has been ordered forfeited to the state or to the county 
under this section may, within 30 days of the final publication ot notice or 
his receipt of notice under Subsection <16)(a), whichever is earlier, peti-
tion the court for a hearing to adjudicate the validity of his alleged inter-
est in the property. The hearing is held before the court without a jury. 
(c) The petition shall be in writing and signed by the petitioner under 
penalty of perjury. It shall set forth the nature and extent of the peti-
tioner's right, title, or interest in the property, the time and circum-
stances of the petitioner's acquisition of the right, title, or interest in the 
property, and any additional facts supporting the petitioner's claim, and 
the relief sought. 
(d) The hearing on the petition shall, to the extent practicable, be heid 
within 30 days of the filing of the petition. The court may consolidate the 
hearing on the petition and any petition tiled by any other person unaer 
this section, other than the defendant. 
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te; At the hearing, the petitioner mav testify and present evidence and 
witnesses on his own behalf ana cross-examine witnesses who appear at 
the hearing. The attorney general or countv attorney mav present evi-
dence ana witnesses m rebuttal and in defense of the claim to the proo-
erty and cross-examine witnesses who appear at the hearing. In addition 
to testimony and evidence presented at the hearing, the court shall con-
sider the relevant portion or the record of the criminal case which resulted 
m the order of forfeiture. The court is not bound by the Utah Rules of 
Evidence at a hearing held under this subsection. 
if) The court shall amend the order of forfeiture m accordance with its 
determination, if after the hearing the court determines that the peti-
tioner has established by a preponderance of the evidence that: 
(i) the oetitioner nas a legal right, title, or interest in the property, 
and the right, title, or interest renders the order of forfeiture invalid 
in whole or in part because the right, title, or interest was vested in 
the petitioner rather than the defendant or was superior to any right, 
title, or interest of the defendant at the time of the commission of tne 
acts or conduct which gave rise to the forfeiture of the property under 
this section; or 
(ii) the petitioner is a bona tide purchaser for value of the right, 
title, or interest in the property ana at the time of purchase reason-
ably believed that the property was not subject to forfeiture under 
this section. 
(g) Following the court's disposition of all petitions filed under this 
subsection, or if no petitions are riled following the expiration .if the 
period Droviaed in Subsection il6>i b) for the tiling of petitions, the btate or 
the county has clear title to property subject to the order of forfeiture and 
may warrant good title to any subsequent purchaser or transferee. 
History: C. 1953, > 76-10- lfiOa.5. enac ted 
by L. 1987, eh. 2:!S, * 4. 
76-10-1604. Enforcement authority of peace officers. 
Notwithstanding anv law to the contrary, peace officers in the state of Utah 
shall have authority to enforce rhe criminal provisions of this act by initiating 
investigations, assisting grand juries, obtaining indictments, tiling informa-
tions, and assisting in the prosecution of criminal cases through the attorney 
general or county attorneys' offices. 
History: C. 1953, 76-10-1(504, enac ted by 
L. 1981. ch. 34, * 1. 
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76-10-1605, Remedies of person injured by a pattern of un-
lawful activity — Double damages — Costs, in-
cluding attorney's fee — Arbitration — Agency — 
Burden of proof — Actions by attorney general 
or county attorney — Dismissal — Statute of limi-
tations — Authorized orders of district court. 
' I ) A oerson iniured m his oerson. business, or property oy a person en-
gaged m conduct forbidden bv anv provision or > 76-10-1603 mav sue m an 
appropriate district court ana recover twice the damages he sustains, regard-
less of whether: 
'a) "he imurv is separate or aistmct from the miurv sutfered as a result 
or the acts or conduct constituting the pattern or unlawful conduct alleged 
as part of the cause of action; or 
(b) the conduct has been adjudged criminal bv any court of the state or 
of the United States 
(2) A partv who prevails on a cause of action brougnt under this section 
recovers the cost of the suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee. 
13) xAll actions ^rismtr under this section whicn are grounded in iraud are 
subject to arbitration under Chapter ,31, Title 78. 
'4) In ail actions under this section, a principal is liaole for actual damages 
for harm caused ov an agent acting within the scope oi either his empiovment 
or apparent authority. A Dnncipai is haoie for dounle damages only if the 
pattern ot unlaw rul activity alleged and pi oven as part or the cause of action 
was authorized, solicited, requested, commanded, undertaken, performed, or 
recklessly tolerated by the board of directors or a high managerial agent 
acting withm the ^oope of his umolovment. 
<5; In ail actions arising under this section, the burden of proof is clear and 
convincing evidence. 
(6) The attorney general or any county attorney may maintain actions un-
der this section on behalf of rhe state, the county, or anv person injured by a 
person engaged m conduct "brbidden by any provision of $ 76-10-lbOS, to 
prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined in chis section and may recover 
the damages and costs allowed by this section. 
(7) In all actions under this section, the elements of each claim or cause of 
action shall be stated with particularity against each defendant. 
(8) If an action, claim, or counterclaim brought or asserted by a private 
party under this section is dismissed prior to trial or disposed of on summary 
judgment, or if it is determined at trial that there is no liability, the prevail-
ing party shall recover from the party who brought the action or asserted the 
claim or counterclaim the amount of its reasonable expenses incurred because 
of the defence against the action, claim, or counterclaim, including a reason-
able attorney's fee. 
(9) An action or proceeding brought under this section shall be commenced 
within three years after the conduct prohibited by ^ 76-10-1603 terminates or 
the cause of action accrues, whichever is later. This provision supersedes any 
limitation to the contrary 
(10) «a) In any action Drought under this section, the district court has 
jurisdiction to prevent, restrain, or remedy injury as defined by this sec-
57 
tion by issuing appropriate orders aiter making provisions tor the rights 
of innocent persons. 
ib) Before liability is determined in any action brousnt under this sec-
tion, the diotnct court may: 
a) issue restraining oraers and injunctions: 
(ii) require satisfactory performance bonds or any other bond it 
considers appropriate and necessary in connection with any prouerty 
or any requirement imposed upon a party by rhe court: ana 
(lii; enter any other order the court considers necessary and 
proper. 
ic) After a determination of liability, the district court mav, m addition 
to granting the relief allowed in Subsection i l) , do any one or all of the 
loilowmg: 
U) order any person to divest himself of any interest m or any 
control, direct or indirect, of any enterDrise: 
(iD imoose reasonable restrictions on the future activities or in-
vestments or anv person, including prohibiting any person from en-
gaging in the same type of endeavor as the enterprise engaged in. 10 
the extent the Utah Constitution and the Constitution of the United 
States permit: or 
(iii) order the dissolution or reorganization of any enterprise, 
(d) However, if an action is orougnt to obtain any relief oroviaed by 
this section, and if the conduct prohibited bv ?^ 76-10-1603 has for its 
pattern of unlawful activity acts or conduct illegal under ^ 76-10-1204. 
76-10-1205, 76-10-1206. or 76-10-1222, the court mav not enter any order 
that would amount to a prior restraint on the exercise of an affected 
party's rights under the First Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, or Article L. Sec. 15 or the Utah Constitution. The court 
shall, upon the request ot any atfected party, and upon the notice to ail 
parties, prior to the issuance of any order provided for in this suosection, 
and at any later time, hold hearings as necessary to determine whether 
any materials at issue are obscene or pornographic and to determine if 
there is probable cause to believe that any act or conduct alleged violates 
§ 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-1206, or76-10-l222. In making its find-
ings the court shall be guided by the same considerations required of a 
court making similar tmdings in criminal caseb brought under 
§ 76-10-1204, 76-10-1205, 76-10-L206, or 76-10-1222. including, but not 
limited to, the definitions in §§ 76-10-1201, 76-10-1203, and 76-10-1216, 
and the exemptions in .} 76-10-1226. 
History: C. 195.5, * 76-10-1605, enacted by by Laws 1981, ch. 94, ^ 1. relating to remedies 
L. 1987, ch. 238, } 5, of a person injured by '\ pattern or racKereenn^ 
Compiler's Note*». — Laws 1()87, ch. 238. activity, and enacts the present section. 
§ 5 repealed former ? 76-10-1605, as enacted 
76-10-1606. Repealed. 
Repeal*. — Laws 1987, ^h 2^8, ^ 8 repeals ch. 23 I, 5 4, relating to oavmenrs ro the _;en-
$ 76-10-1606, as last amended bv Law^ 19S5. eral fund of the state or a countv 
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76-6-30S. Bribery of or receiving bribe by person in the business of 
selection, appraisal* or criticism of goods or services.—(I"" A person is 
guuty ot a clai>3 B misdemeanor when, without the consent of the employer 
or principal, contrary to the interests of the employer or principal. 
(a) He confers, offers, or agrees to confer upon the employee, agent, 
or fiduciary of an employer or principal any benent with the puroose of 
influencing the conduct of the eniT)loye*7 agent, or fiduciary in relating to 
his employer's or principal's affairs; or 
(b) He, as an employee, agent, or fiduciary of an employer or princi-
pal, solicits, accepts, or agrees 1o accept any benefit from anorher upon an 
agreement or understanding that such benefit will influence nis conduct m 
relation to his employers or principal's affairs; provided that this section 
does not apply to inducements made or accepted solely for the purpose ot 
causing a chancre m employment by an employee, agent, or fiduciary. 
(2) A person is gudty of "Violation of this section if he holds himself 
out to the puolic as being engaged m the business of making disinterested 
selection, appraisal, or criticism of goods or services and he solicits, ac-
cepts, or agrees to accept any benefit to iniluence his selection, appraisal, 
or criticism. 
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